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LIABILITY OF BIAS: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY OF GENDER-RELATED 
INTERESTS IN NEGLIGENCE LAW 
YIFAT BITTON1
ABSTRACT 
This article examines a feminist argument concerning the gendered 
structure of tort law in which interests that can be identified as gendered 
are subject to different levels of recognition resulting from gender bias. 
Using a comparative methodology, the article contends that negligence 
law regarding pure-economic loss and indirect-emotional harm is 
constructed along lines of gender bias. The argument is underlined by the 
notion of gender-related interests, establishing pure-economic loss as 
male-related and indirect-emotional harm as female-related. On its first 
comparative analysis, the similarities and differences between these two 
harms as perceived by tort conventions and principles should have 
yielded leverage to indirect-emotional harm as fitting more squarely with 
tort law’s fundamental conceptions than its counterpart, pure-economic 
loss. However, the course of legal recognition both harms have 
undergone in Anglo-American negligence law reveals that both losses 
were relatively similarly alienated from negligence law.  
1. Assistant professor, The College of Management Law School, Israel and Peking University 
School of Transnational Law, China. Ph.D. The Hebrew University (2005); Visiting Researcher, 
Harvard University Law School (2004-2005); LLM, Yale Law School (2009). I wish to thank 
Professor Mirjan Damaska for his thoughtful remarks on comparative analysis of Israeli law. I also 
wish to thank Professor James Whitman for his encouragement to pursue this project. Tsachi Keren-
Paz’s comments on earlier versions were I opening and Roni Mann has been one of her kind with her 
organizational thinking. Elad Rom’s editing and research assistance were invaluable to me as well.    
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Seeking further resources from which to draw on the significance of the 
gendered nature of these interests within negligence law, the article then 
proceeds to its second comparative dimension. Here it reviews Israeli 
negligence law, where indirect-emotional harm and economic loss 
function as legal implantations imported from Anglo-American law. 
Notwithstanding its deepest Anglo-American legal roots, Israeli 
negligence law, nonetheless, reveals a sharp departure in its adjudication 
on the matter from the Anglo-American tradition. Probing deeper into 
Israeli tort law, illuminates a unique phenomenon whereby the rhetoric 
of the court attributes the same relative-illegitimacy to both economic 
loss and indirect-emotional harm. However, reality indicates they are 
subject to significantly different treatment. This biased pattern bears 
harmful distributive implications as it embodies a two-dimension 
discrimination practice whereby in addition to disadvantaging female-
related interests, negligence law unequally prefers male-related interests. 
Specific attention is given in the article to the comparative phenomenon 
whereby the Israeli legal system that draws so heavily on dominant 
Anglo-American law administers negligence law upon more 
discriminatory standards thereby reflecting the gendered nature of 
Anglo-American negligence law. 
“The law of torts values physical security and property more 
highly than emotional security and human relationships. This 
apparently gender-neutral hierarchy of values has privileged 
man, as the traditional owners and managers of property, and has 
burdened women to whom the emotional work of maintaining 
human relationships has commonly been assigned.”2
INTRODUCTION 
Feminist analyses of tort law have shown how common-law tort law is 
structured in a discriminatory manner, serving as an andocentric legal 
institution that reflects typical male perspectives as the norm through its 
core concepts such as duty, causation, foreseeability and compensation.3
Prominent among these feminist critiques was the claim that tort law’s 
attitude towards emotional and psychological interests within negligence 
liability is problematic, incoherent and reflective of judicial rigidity. 
Feminists argued, convincingly, that this approach of tort law was 
primarily distributive in view of society's perception of these interests 
 2. Martha Chamallas (with Linda K. Kerber), Women, Mothers and the Law of Fright: A 
History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814, 814 (1990). 
3. See generally, Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law,
146 UNIV. OF PENN. L. REV. 463 (1998). For an overview of most of the seminal writing see the 
references at Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Tort Scholarship 78 CORNELL LR 575 (1993). 
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(whether justifiably or not) as “feminine.”4 These feminists’ main target 
of criticism was the limited recognition given to plaintiffs who were 
indirectly-emotionally harmed. According to feminist studies, these 
plaintiffs, who were by large women, brought to the court their quest for 
compensation for the emotional harm they suffered consequential to the 
defendant’s injury of their loved ones.5 The courts, in retreat, have 
established a very narrow rule of recognition for this loss, positioning it 
at the margins of tort law and its societal implications. Feminist analyses 
of the leading cases in this field showed how the legal tools used in the 
adjudication to settle these cases reflected an androcentric mindset. 
Women were perceived as highly sensitive and hysterical in a manner 
rendering the harm caused to them (usually to their pregnancy) 
unforeseeable and hence, not compensable.6 Other feminist analysis 
showed how shaping the rule stood in contrast with acceptable and 
traditional negligence law reasoning.7 The fact that women were 
disproportionally affected by these rulings added another gendered 
dimension to its feminine-related characteristic.8
Consequently, feminists charged negligence law with androcentrism and 
saturation with male bias:9
“It is a variant of disparate impact analysis...noncontroversial 
legal standards can sometimes systematically disadvantage 
women. When I speak of ‘male bias’ I am including practices 
that have a negative, even if unintended, impact.” 
However, an objection can be raised to the seemingly incomplete nature 
of this feminist project in tort law.10 One might argue that current 
4. See generally. Chamallas, ibid, at 465-466; Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 2, at 814-815; 
Elizabeth Handsley, Mental Injury Occasioned by Harm to Another: A Feminist Critique, 14 LAW &
INEQ. J. 391, 458-485 (1996); Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 190 (1992). 
5. Chamallas & Kerber, ibid, at 814. 
6. Chamallas and Kerber, supra note 2, at 816-825. 
7. Handsley, supra note 4. 
8. Chamallas and Kerber, supra note 2, at 814. The authors refer to two other researches as 
substantiating this fact: Leon Green “Fright” Cases, 27 U. ILL. L. REV. 761 (1933) (indicated that 35 
out of the 40 claims he analyzed were brought by women, therefore related to this claim as “women-
dominated.”) The second source was Hubert Winston Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and 
Disease: Legal Liability to Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV. 193 (1944), who found a ration of 1:5 in 
favor of women as bringing these claims to the courts.  
9. Martha Chamallas, Importing Feminist Theories to Change Tort Law, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S
L.J. 389, 391. Also see Leslie Bender, Is Tort Law Male? Foreseeability Analysis and Property 
Managers' Liability for Third Party Rapes of Residents, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 313 (1993).  
10. Being aware of the legitimacy that my response awards this objection, I wish to clarify that 
I respect it as long as it is understood as suggesting that analyzing the “masculine” interests can 
reinforce the feminist claim regarding the gendered structure of tort law. Accordingly, I reject this 
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feminist analyses focus on female-related interests and female 
experiences in order to conclude that tort law is androcentric looks only 
at one side of the equation of this legal field’s gendered nature. Such an 
objection is not designed to weaken what I would term “first tier feminist 
analysis of tort law,” but rather to explore the horizontal scope of the 
gendered structure of tort law and the extent to which it applies. 
Responding to this challenge, the article aims at adding the “male” side 
of the tort equation into its feminist analysis by applying a comparative 
review of courts' attitudes towards a seemingly-similar interest  which 
can be perceived as “masculine.”11 Hence, it offers a “second tier 
feminist analysis of tort law” which seeks to provide a more holistic 
review of negligence law’s gender bias, complementing its predecessors’ 
critique. First tier feminist critique has proved that negligence law carries 
one dimension of discrimination embodied in its unjustified negative 
attitude towards female-related interests whereas this second tier analysis 
is interested in determining whether a subsequent dimension is added to 
it through privileging male-related interests. My analysis is carried by 
comparing the legal construction of the recognition of indirect-emotional 
harm–perceived as clearly “feminine”–to the legal construction of 
another form of harm, namely economic loss–which as will be soon 
elaborated, should be perceived as “masculine.”
I have selected economic loss as a comparative yardstick not only due to 
its gendered attributes, but also because it shares many other main 
characteristics with indirect-emotional harm. Just like indirect-emotional 
harm, it raises substantial doubts as to its compatibility with the 
paradigmatic protection tendencies of interests embedded in negligence 
law. It also challenges the boundaries of liability imposition within this 
wrong's framework.12 The intimate relation these harms share-which are 
acknowledged by the courts themselves-has set the stage for comparing 
them as having a similar fixed starting point. However, in other respects, 
indirect-emotional harm provided a better launching pad than that of the 
economic loss on different levels. These include internal-doctrinal 
questions within tort law, the losses’ interrelations with contract law, and 
both economic analysis and corrective justice considerations. These 
differences indicated that indirect-emotional harm made a better and a 
objection if being understood as de-legitimizing this feminist claim, which was so lucidly and 
convincingly established in the past.    
11. The claim that interests are perceived as gender related shall be substantiated later in this 
introduction. See text accompanying footnotes 16-37.  
12. The analogy between “interests” and “losses” in this case is clear and full. Usually, there is 
no necessary correlation between the interest protected in tort law and the loss it incurs. However, in 
the case at hand, there is a full fit between these tortuous concepts. For these concepts see PETER 
CANE, TORT LAW AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS 6-8 (2nd Ed. 1996).   
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more natural fit to negligence law’s scope of protection, whereas 
economic loss raised substantial challenges to it, rendering the losses’ 
eligibility for similar protection questionable. Based on these differences 
I hypothesized that among these two losses, indirect-emotional harm will 
enjoy better recognition within negligence law adjudication. However, a 
review of the leading cases discussing these interests proved this 
hypothesis wrong. It revealed that both types of harm have ultimately 
gained a relatively similar position of very limited recognition within 
negligence law.  
Standing alone, this finding could be read as implying a lack of gender-
based adherence to one interest over the other. Yet, read against the 
above-mentioned comparative context, the “balanced” finding seems to 
reflect the one dimension discrimination against indirect-emotional harm 
which should have had the upper hand in being more easily embraced 
into tort law. The courts’ usage of similar explanatory discourse in 
justifying the two losses’ “shared destiny” as deserving an “exclusionary 
rule” of non-liability, strongly supports this proposition as well. It 
exemplifies courts’ disregard of their important inherent differences.  
The finding does not strongly support the counter, somewhat intuitive 
postulation, that negligence law carries simultaneously a second 
dimension of discrimination whereby it treats male-related interests as 
deserving over-protection. In this respect, the holistic feminist analysis of 
Anglo-American negligence law demonstrates that a bias against 
feminine interests within a fixed setting does not necessarily entail a 
counter bias privileging male interests. This revelation might also be read 
as weakening the feminist assertion regarding the gendered characteristic 
of the indirect-emotional and economic interests.  
Seeking further resources from which to draw on the significance of the 
gendered nature of these interests within negligence law, regardless of 
the seemingly balanced picture laid-out by Anglo-American law, the 
article proceeds to its second comparative dimension where it compares 
Anglo-American and Israeli negligence law with respect to indirect-
emotional harm and economic loss.     
Israel’s tort law domain is paradigmatically common-law, reflecting and 
embracing Anglo-American general conceptions and specific legal 
doctrines which function as legal transplantations and as a main source 
of adjudication.13 Therefore, the basis for comparing these legal systems 
13. Menachem Mautner, Rules and Standards in the New Israeli Civil Code – The 
Jurisprudence of Legislation, 18 MISHPATIM LR 321 (1998) (Hebrew).  
42
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is well-established. At the same time, differences to be revealed between 
these systems enable us to identify them as significant to understanding 
the impact of gender-bias legal transplantations and to analyze them 
more compellingly. On a more substantial level, the comparative analysis 
serves in this article as a tool to evaluate the feminist contention that 
common-law tort law is androcentric and perceives interests as gender-
related. My hypothesis is that gender-biased doctrines of one system, 
once transplanted in another, would adapt the patterns of gender bias 
characteristic to the new legal system. Being a legal implantation within 
Israeli law, the Anglo-American doctrines regarding both these interests 
were expected to adjust to their new legal surroundings by adapting to 
the local “receptors” of the gendered perceptions they represent and 
adopt their mannerisms. The comparative perspective here is therefore 
meant to problematize the seemingly balanced picture presented in 
Anglo-American law, since the Israeli case presents a much different 
picture, whereby three dimensions of discrimination within this realm 
can be identified. 
Israeli courts have gone much farther with their protection of economic 
interests and further broadened their scope of liability, infringing upon 
almost every possible boundary set by Anglo-American case law in this 
realm (first dimension of discrimination). At the same time, Israeli courts 
have further established boundaries and limitations on negligence 
liability for indirect-emotional harm, finally framing a very narrow and 
extremely arbitrary duty of care toward potential victims (second 
dimension of discrimination).14 This Israeli extremity is particularly 
interesting in light of the courts’ use of Anglo-American rhetoric 
presenting these two types of interests as suffering from similar 
“negligence hostility.” This way, the extreme gap between these two 
gender-related interests in terms of tort protectionism is denied by the 
court (third dimension of discrimination).  
The article suggests that this comparative analysis related phenomenon 
of departure from the mother-systems supports the feminist analysis of 
the two interests as being gendered and resulting in gender-bias. Though 
absorbed through seemingly neutral doctrines, the extremist application 
by Israeli courts of Anglo-American gender-based tendencies was an 
exercise of legal transplantations adapting to their new settings. These 
doctrines were now developed within a more gender-stratified socio-
legal system which maintains at the same time a legal rhetoric of 
14. See the detailed construction of the two damages at YIFAT BITTON, RE-READING TORT 
LAW FROM A FEMINIST-EGALITARIAN PERSPECTIVE 71-143 (Dissertation, served to the Hebrew 
University Senate, 2004) (Hebrew). 
6
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 16 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol16/iss1/8
2010] LIABILITY OF BIAS 69
advanced gender equality. Shaped accordingly, these doctrines were 
applied in Israel in a gendered manner that added other dimensions of 
discrimination to negligence law, rendering it triple-dimensional. This 
discriminatory structure can be easily associated with the Israeli legal 
system’s typical administration of women’s rights, whereby Israel holds 
a rhetoric level which reflects an admirable rather than a reality-based 
legal stance.15
The comparative analysis also presents Israeli courts as exemplifying a 
stronger version of gender disparity analysis whereby gender-related 
interests are set within a zero-sum game structure where what men gain 
in negligence liability rules, women lose, or alternatively stated: while 
men gain, women lose. The regressive distributive implications of this 
structure are discussed thereafter. 
My article proceeds in six parts: Part I introduces the notion of gender-
related interests as the premise upon which my argument is built, as well 
as establishes pure-economic loss as male-related and indirect-emotional 
harm as female-related. Part I also pinpoints the significance of critically 
analyzing negligence law from a feminist perspective. In Part II, the 
similarities and differences between these two harms as perceived by tort 
conventions and principles will be introduced to create a common ground 
for their comparison. In part III, the article will briefly present the course 
of legal recognition both harms have undergone in Anglo-American 
negligence law, followed by a presentation of their path in Israeli 
negligence law. Part IV aims at shedding some light on the details of the 
course which enabled the sharp departure Israeli adjudication has taken 
on the matter from its Anglo-American counterparts. Probing deeper into 
Israeli tort law, this part introduces a unique phenomenon whereby court 
rhetoric attributes the same relative-illegitimacy to both economic loss 
and indirect-emotional harm. However, reality indicates they are subject 
to significantly differential treatment. These findings are best illustrated 
by comparing the leading cases to establish recognition of the two harms 
and by pointing to the various methodological as well as substantial tools 
Israeli courts have used to differentiate their recognition path so 
distinctively. Part V presents the harmful distributive implications of the 
two dimension discrimination practice of preferring economic loss over 
indirect-emotional harm. Specific attention is given in Part XI to the 
15. This kind of comparative analysis is considered to yield more comprehensive and more 
useful understanding of comparative law projects. See James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and 
Respect: Three Societies 109 YALE LJ 1279, 1281 (2000) Whitman here stresses that a comparative 
analysis should go beyond comparing “black letter” laws, and search for further tools of comparison 
that seek the practical application of these laws by the courts etc.  
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comparative phenomenon whereby the Israeli legal system that draws so 
heavily on dominant Anglo-American law administers negligence law 
with more discriminatory standards thereby reflecting the gendered 
nature of Anglo-American negligence law.  
PART I: INTRODUCING GENDER-RELATED INTERESTS AND 
LOSSES
1. ON GENDER-RELATED INTERESTS
This paper is premised on the notion that societal values identified as 
feminine are being devalued compared to masculine values, irrespective 
of their actual social merit.16  Therefore, we must first establish the 
notion of values as gender related. Within the context of tort law, 
masculine and feminine values transform into interests that are valued by 
it as recognized and protected or rejected by it.17 These interests bear 
gender significance, and can thus be referred to as “gender-related 
interests,” in spite of the difficulties and the risks entailed.18
An argument that relies on the concept of gender-related values can be 
supported by several rationales, such as the biological one, based on the 
belief that there is a genuine fundamental difference between men and 
women as a matter of biological and psychological determinism. Another 
rationale is the social one based on the belief that the differences between 
men and women are gender oriented and are the outcome of patriarchal 
social structuring which has led each gender to adopt different life-
experiences characterized with typical forms of behavior, preferences 
and even values.19
In my research, however, I have chosen to put the argument primarily on 
the metaphoric level rationale. On this level, gender does indeed play a 
role in attributing values to genders and evaluating them accordingly. 
However, it derives from a metaphorical level and relies on existing 
factual data. Gender has a significance which is not necessarily 
 16. This assumption is based in “the cultural feminism” theory; see JUDITH EVANS, FEMINIST 
THEORY TODAY – AN INTRODUCTION TO SECOND-WAVE FEMINISM 19-20 (1995). The author 
describes this view as- “‘weak’ cultural feminism”. 
 17. The manner in which tort law values interests, however, is not dichotomous. The interests 
are located along a continuum of strong protection and total rejection ends.  
 18. Difficulties: due to the fear of determinism and essentialism of the strict division of fluid 
life values in a multicolored society. The risks: due to the fear of stereotyping the gendered objects.   
 19. The first approach is perceived as old-fashioned, while the second approach receives a 
wide support (Evans, supra note 16 at 160-161). However, it seems as though the latter also bears 
some sense of social determinism, according to which there is no room for biologic or any other 
influences on the genders aside from their pre-intended structuring. 
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biological or social, but merely one which is attributed to it as a factual 
matter on a metaphorical level.20 The advantage of using the 
metaphorical argument lies in its simplicity. Within this context, we can 
classify values as “feminine” or “masculine” as a factual given status that 
is composed of metaphorical factors which do not necessarily have a 
scientific-social explanation. Put this way, the research is immune from 
determinist or essentialist arguments, and the attitude towards values 
which are attributed to gender can be examined irrespective of the reason 
for that attribution.21
2. WOMEN, EMOTIONS AND INDIRECT-EMOTIONAL HARM
Women are perceived by society as the “sensitive gender.” By this I do 
not mean that women are more sensitive than men, but that emotion and 
mental suffering to which sensitivity may lead are gender-related values. 
Hence, they are consequently more effective and apparent in women's 
lives. Ever since the time of Plato, reason has been attributed to man and 
emotion to women. Women are perceived as the ones who surrender to 
their emotions and therefore require the protection and restraint of the 
rational man.22 During the period of the Enlightenment, when abstract 
and logical thinking was valued as the only legitimate form of 
knowledge, philosophers of that time preferred the rational and logical 
over the emotional which was long associated with women's weakness.23
These stereotypes regarding women have persisted even to the present. 
World-wide polls, conducted by Gallup in 1996 and in 2001, showed 
that most of those surveyed, both men and women, tended to describe 
women as more emotional and loving than men. Only 6% of those 
questioned the thought that “affection” was a manly trait.24 A similar 
pattern of thinking was also found in Israeli society.25
20. Here, I borrow Joanne Conaghan's proposal set at Tort Law and the Feminist Critique of 
Reason in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON THE FOUNDATIONAL SUBJECTS OF LAW (ANNE BOTTOMELY 
ED) 47, 56-58 (1996). Connaghan designs the metaphoric relation in accordance with the 
distributive, gender-based, reality regarding those values. 
21. My research avoids the trap of essentialism since it is not aimed at presenting a tort-based 
type of women, but rather to present a deconstructive challenge to the non-political evaluation of 
seemingly neutral values within tort law. 
22. Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. LR 797, 804 (1989). 
23. Williams, ibid, at 804. 
24. NANCY LEVIT, THE GENDER LINE 33 (1998). The 2001 poll was based in America and 
resulted in 90% of those surveyed opining that the characteristic “emotions” applies to women rather 
than to men. See http://people.howstuffworks.com/women1.htm (last visited 2/14/2009).  
25. A survey held by the Israeli government revealed that some human characteristic bear 
gender relativity. For example, traits such as gentleness, affection, tenderness and affection to 
children were described by Israeli people as “feminine”. The Status of Women as Perceived by the 
Israeli Public, WOMEN STATUS 4: 3, 8 (1984). 
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Even if the association between women and emotion is a result of a 
socially constructed stereotype, it is still of great importance. Stereotypes 
are tools to structure reality. Thus, they are absorbed into social
consciousness where they can establish “genuine” differences between 
men and women. Putting aside the question of the “true” nature of these 
stereotypes and the wrong which can arise from them.26 I will focus on 
the influence they exert on social awareness which sees emotions and 
compassion as “women's interests.” The existence of this perception 
strengthens the assumption that emotion and compassion are indeed 
female-related interests and therefore, receive less protection in tort 
law.27
Indirect-emotional harm is tightly rooted in this basic notion of 
emotionality. It is identified as the emotional and mental suffering 
caused to a person within a relationship setting. A prominent example is 
of A’s claim against C who negligently harmed B. Within this setting, A 
suffers emotional and mental pain arising out of a physical injury to her 
loved one, B, with B’s injury resulting from C’s negligent behavior.28
This damage is intangible and indirect by virtue of not arising from a 
physical injury to the plaintiff (A) herself, but rather from injury to a 
third party, B, to whom she is related. Although having a direct impact 
on the plaintiff, this damage is perceived as indirect since it is the 
outcome of an injury performed against someone else's body and not 
against the plaintiff's self. A clear example of such harm, and the most 
common one, is that caused to a mother who suffers emotional harm as a 
result of an injury caused to her child in an accident, either by means of 
witnessing the accident or its immediate aftermath. Within this setting, 
this loss relates more particularly to emotions related to the care of 
others, which is more typically considered a female virtue.29 Moreover, 
statistics show that plaintiffs with indirect-emotional harm claims were 
26. Stereotypes, needless to say, are highly harmful to the single person subjected to them, as 
well as to the group to which he belongs. LEVIT, supra note 24, at 33-36, 202-204.  
27. Emotional harms in general are more common among women than men. Lucinda M. 
Finley, Symposium: The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53
EMORY L.J. 1263, 1281-1282 (2004). 
 28. My interest is limited to this specific type of emotional harm as “feminine”. However, 
generally speaking, the recognition of emotional distress within Anglo-American law has been 
qualified and limited to intentional torts from the outset. It was only at more advanced stages that 
these limitations have been relaxed. See, e.g., the elaboration of these developments at Cohen v. 
Varig Airlines, 380 N.Y.S. 2nd 450, 459-456 (Civ Ct. 1975).
29. The “Ethics of care’ is attributed to women mainly through the work of Carol Gilligan, IN
A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). Researches also indicate that most care work is burdened by women.
See, e.g., Julie Holliday Wayne and Bryanne L. Cordiero, Who is a Good Organizational Citizen? 
Social Perception of Male and Female Employees Who Use Family Leave, 49 SEX ROLES 233, 235 
(2003). 
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predominantly women, thereby implying that women are also 
disproportionally affected by liability rules governing these claims.30
It is therefore the female-related trait of this loss that triggered the 
interest of first tier feminist analysts of tort law in reframing the qualified 
recognition this loss has gained within negligence law as reflecting a 
gender bias against women. 
3. MEN, ECONOMICS AND PURE-ECONOMIC LOSS
The economic superiority of men as well as the economic inferiority of 
women indeed rely on discriminatory gender stereotypes but are a very 
viable reality.31 Men control financial and economical resources and are 
therefore primary addressees of their policy effects.32 The public sphere 
in which business activity takes place ejects women, who are located 
traditionally in the “private” spheres of life–comprised of the home and 
the family–outside the boundaries of the business world. Women's 
inferior position in the work force, employment in low-wage jobs, and 
socio-economic role as secondary providers in the family, are merely 
some of the factors shaping their economical subordination relative to 
men.33 In addition, in our world, the acquisition and ownership of assets 
are controlled mainly by men,34 inter alia because throughout history 
women were denied access to economic independence and autonomy.35
The dichotomy of market and home is in complete harmony with the link 
that is made between women as those who are the primary caretakers of 
their children, while the men are found in the public sphere of the 
“market” and manage the economic life of the family.36 Consequently, 
30. Statistical research reveals that women established the majority of plaintiffs in cases where 
emotional interests were the claim's subject. Historically, the “fright” claims represented two 
paradigmatic feminine harms: the first being prenatal damages induced by nervous shock, and the 
second being emotional and mental suffering due to harming one’s child (Chamallas & Kerber, 
supra note 2, at 814). Caring for one’s child is mainly a feminine burden, though research has 
proven that both genders are equally able to carry it (LEVIT, supra note 24, at 25 – 26, 29-32). 
31. Joan Williams, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO 
DO ABOUT IT 64-76 (2000).  
32. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, as of 2002, Women-owned firms account for 28.2 
percent of all nonfarm businesses, 6.4 percent of their employment and 4.2 percent of their receipts. 
See http://www.census.gov/csd/sbo/womensummaryoffindings.htm  
33. LEVIT, supra note 24, at 53. 
34. For the systematic origins of this inferiority, see Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: 
Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REV. 421, 422-423 notes 7-9 (1992). (The author offers an 
economical analysis of women's inferiority in a world founded on property rights).
35. SANDRA FREDMAN, WOMEN AND THE LAW 256-257 (1997).  
36. For the notion of the dichotomy between the market and the family as discriminatory and 
incoherent, see, generally, Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and 
Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV.  (1983).
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men disproportionately benefit from nurturing of economic interests. 
Hence, laws which are designed according to this patriarchal pattern will 
likely operate to predominantly benefit men. 
Pure-economic loss fits squarely into this theoretical framework. 
Defining it is a difficult task, as demonstrated by the courts’ failure to 
provide a definition which will determine the clear scope of this loss.37
However, in rough terms this damage can be defined by distinguishing it 
from other recognized forms of damages: physical harm (to person or 
property) and collateral economic loss. It is distinguished from the 
former by being intangible and potentially consequential upon it38 and 
from the latter by being independent, not collateral to some prior damage 
to the plaintiff’s own body or property.39 Therefore, this damage is 
termed “pure” because it arises independently without being collateral, to 
other damage and without other damages necessarily accompanying it. 
An example of such harm which readily springs to mind is the case 
where A, who is a business owner, to which the only passageway is B’s 
bridge, suffers financial loss after being compelled to close her business 
upon B’s bridge being destroyed by C’s negligent behavior. A’s tort 
claim against C constitutes a claim for pure-economic loss.40 Pure-
economic loss is typically generated within a contractual setting and 
relates mainly to a loss of money, thereby rendering it particularly 
relevant to the business sphere where as mentioned above, women suffer 
substantial disadvantage compared with men.  
Economic loss, therefore, bears gender significance that pertains mainly 
to men and is thus an important site for “second tier” feminist analysis 
that would complement the existing feminist scholarship in this field and 
would provide a fuller picture of the gendered protection tendencies of 
negligence law.  
37. David Ronen, Pure Economical Loss from a Comparative Perspective, 44 HAPRAKLIT LR, 
504, 504 (2000) (Hebrew); Tamar Gedron also presents a variety of reasons for the absence of this 
definition: Tamar Gedron, The Duty of Care in the Negligence Injustice and Pure Economical Loss,
42 HAPRAKLIT LR  126, 129-130 (1995) (Hebrew). For the commonly used categories of pure-
economic loss, see ROBBY BERNSTEIN, ECONOMIC LOSS 2-5 (2nd ed. 1998). 
38. BERNSTEIN, ibid, at 1. I prefer Izhak Englard's definition of the loss as a “Damage which is 
lacking any physical intervention in the property or the body of the injured.” IZHAK ENGLARD, THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF TORT LAW 212 (1993). 
39. Such is the loss of income caused by physical injury.  However, even substantial parasitic 
reliance of the economic loss would enable compensation for the whole damage. JAAP SPIER, OLAV 
HAAZEN, THE LIMITS OF EXPANDING LIABILITY – EIGHT FUNDAMENTAL CASES IN A COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 10 (Jaap Spier ed., 1998). 
40. These were the facts reflected in Nebraska Innkeepers, Inc. v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines 
Corp., 345 N.W.2d 124 (Iowa 1984). 
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4. JUDGES AND NEGLIGENCE LAW
Any gender-related dynamic of tort law should be of interest for feminist 
analysis. Special interest should be given to such a dynamic located 
within negligence law since it carries significant policy-making 
characteristics. This tort is uniquely pragmatic in the way it 
accommodates social developments.41 The elements of judicial/political 
discretion are the central and important factors in negligence law. 
Therefore, rejecting “feminine” interests within this setting strengthens 
the effects of marginalization and the invisibility of women, assuming 
that what judges say and do matters outside the realm of their specific 
rulings.42 More specifically, within negligence law the duty of care 
component functions as a “filter” for all inherently negligent actions. 
Hence, judges reject imposition of liability where it is contradictory to 
the goals of tort law or at least, not serving it properly.43 It is a tool used 
by the court to determine the boundaries of tort liability.44 Therefore, a 
study of how the duty of care emerges can clarify the way in which tort 
law is being used to protect different interests.45 Some perceive the duty 
of care as the court's chief tool in making allocation-based decisions, 
susceptible to political influences.46 This characteristic is no different in 
Israel where the Supreme Court has also given expression to its creative 
normative power by establishing various duties of care in tort law.47
Establishing a duty of care entails a declaration regarding what is worthy 
of tort protection, whether by virtues of the courts’ function as 
41. Jane Stapleton, In Restraint of Tort in THE FRONTIERS OF LIABILITY 83, 83-84 (PETER
BIRKS ED., VOL. 2, 1994). 
42. For the practice of storytelling as having powerful political and societal effects see Richard 
Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 
(1989); Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child 
Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1988).  
43. That is the duty’s function in common-law tort law. See Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. 
Keating, Abusing “Duty” 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 265 (2006) and Israel Gilead, The Foundations of the 
Negligence Tort in Israeli Law, 14 IYUNEY MISHPAT LR 319, 328, 338 (1988) (Hebrew) (for Israeli 
tort law).  
44. The powerful perception of the duty of care is shared by fairly conservative tort law 
scholars. See W.V.H. ROGERS ED, WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ ON TORT 91 (5th ED. 1998) (“Duty is the 
primary control device”.) Some see the specific question of liability for emotional distress and 
economic loss as pertaining to the concept of proximate cause rather than duty within negligence 
law, but even this view embraces the notions of policy considerations as prevailing in this realm. See
PAGE W. KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 968-973 (5th ED. 1984). 
45. The duty of care was held to “...Highlight(s) the question of the common-law's 
protectionism”. Jane Stapleton, Duty of Care and Economic Loss: A Wider Agenda, 107 L.Q. REV.
249, 249 (1991). 
46. See, e.g., Richard Abel, A Critique of Tort Law, 2 Tort LR 99, 110-115 (1994). 
47. See SC 145/80 Vaknin v. Beit-Shemesh Municipality, P.D. 37 (i) 113, 123 (1982) 
(Hebrew). A summary of this approach in Israeli case law is provided at IZHAK ENGLARD, The 
Adjudication’s Contribution to Developing Tort Law – Self Perception and Reality, 11 IYUNEY 
MISHPAT LR 67, 76-92 (1986) (Hebrew). 
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constituting values or by virtues of it merely declaring their existence.48
In practice, this question defines who an appropriate person is and what 
an appropriate injury is generally “appropriate” and not only appropriate 
for compensation purposes. Tort law is therefore a venue by which the 
legal system can express what is desirable and what is not. Courts’ tort 
protection decisions are designed not to solve a local dispute between 
individuals alone, but rather to establish general social principles in the 
area that can exceed the boundaries of the concrete dispute before the 
court.49
5. WOMEN, MEN, NEGLIGENCE LAW AND DISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS 
Privileging male-related interests, in addition to undermining female-
related interests, can be roughly termed as obvious as they accumulate 
and intersect. It adds another tier of discrimination to the latter in a 
manner that creates a new harm, bigger than the sum of its parts. 
However, I postpone the elaboration on these effects to a later stage in 
this article so as to present them only after a fuller picture of the interests 
and their treatment is revealed.50 This structure will enable the reader to 
better understand the mechanics behind these distributive effects as 
presented by the different systems. On a feminist note, I stress that 
contextual analysis of this kind proves more useful than an abstract one.51
PART II: INDIRECT-EMOTIONAL HARM AND PURE-ECONOMIC 
LOSS:   
A. “NATURAL” COMPARISON ?
1. WHY PURE-ECONOMIC LOSS?
I have selected pure-economic loss as a comparative yardstick since it 
poses a particular challenge to feminist analysis of tort law in that in 
addition to being distinctively “male,” it has a lot in common with 
indirect-emotional loss to the point that they were considered similar in 
48. Courts’ tort rulings are perceived, even in conservative writing, as arenas whereby the 
courts “reacted to the situation in the way in which the great mass of mankind customarily reacts.”
KEETON, supra note 44, at 359. For Israel, see the similar approach brought by (then) Deputy Justice 
Aharon Barak in SC 186/80 Ya’ari v. The State of Israel, P.D. 35(i) 769, 799 (1980) (Hebrew). 
Critical analysis of the law perceives of it as embodying as well as reflecting social ideologies and 
developments. See STEVEN VAGO, LAW AND SOCIETY 318-320 (6th ed. 2000). 
49. ROGERS, supra note 44, at 91. 
50. See infra, part V to this article. 
51. Martha Minow and Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597 (1990) 
(stressing the importance of contextual analysis). 
14
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 16 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol16/iss1/8
2010] LIABILITY OF BIAS 77
scholarship52 and in adjudication.53 Chronologically, the emergence of 
economic loss as establishing a legitimate tort claim parallels that of 
emotional harm; both damages suffered from a lack of sympathy once 
they were deemed to merit protection and compensation under 
negligence law. Structurally, in the cases of indirect-emotional harm as 
well as in a significant proportion of the cases of economic loss, the 
compensation sought was for relational, indirect damages arising from 
the existence of a prior relationship between the injured party and 
another person. Both forms of harm are perceived as abstract and 
therefore, conceptually indigestible to the tort system. Compared with 
tangible harms such as property damage, it was argued that these harms 
could not be properly assessed using any appropriate yardstick.54 Because 
of their nontraditional characteristics, indirect economic and emotional 
harms became the center of attraction for policy considerations, 
specifically whether they deserve protection by the developmental 
process of the duty of care offered by negligence law. Consequently, 
both losses shared the myth of being “step-children” marginal to 
principles of negligence law.55 These shared commonalities subjected 
these losses to a non-compensable dynamic, also known as “the 
exclusionary rule.” Negligence law, which bears a hierarchy of losses 
that it protects, has posited these two losses at the bottom, setting them as 
the last borders to be crossed before imposing limitless liability.56
52. Gedron, supra note 37, at 127-128. This perception dominates also outside of Israel. BASIL
MARKESINIS & SIMON DEAKIN, TORT LAW 21 (5th ed., 2003); ROGERS, supra note 44, at 160, note 
82; Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating, Putting “Duty” in its Place - A Reply to Professors 
Goldberg & Zipursky, (forthcoming) LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW, symposium on 
Frontiers of Tort Liability (2008), at page 20 to the draft. 
53. See, e.g., Hevican v. Ruane [1991] 3 All E.R. 65 the court uses the case of Caparo 
Industries P.L.C. v. Dickman [1990] 1 All E.R. 568 to justify imposing liability in negligence for 
indirect-emotional harm); Rovenscroft v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic [1991] 3 All E.R. 73 (the 
court uses the case of Anns v. Merton [1977] 2 All E.R. 492 to justify imposing liability for 
depression caused to a woman by her son’s death); Jones v. Wright [1991] 3 All E.R. 88 (the 
minority judge uses Caparo, ibid, to deny liability for indirect-emotional harm from a plaintiff that 
was not the spouse nor a parent of the direct victim of the unlawful wrong); Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 
501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974) (The court relies on Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (1968), regarding 
indirect-emotional harm, to justify compensation for pure-economic loss).  
54. DAVID HOWARTH, TEXTBOOK ON TORT 303-306 (1995) (economic loss), 235 (emotional 
harm).  
55. This is well demonstrated in the Introduction wrote by Gary Schwartz, one of the authors 
of the drafts of the Restatement (Third) on Tort. When describing the restatement project as one 
dealing with general principles of tort law, Schwartz clarifies: “Given the project’s ‘general’ 
interests, the project does not cover such special topics as professional liability and landowner 
liability; and given its focus on the core of tort law, it does not itself consider liability for emotional 
distress or economic loss.” (The introduction as brought at Martha Chamallas, Removing Emotional 
Harm from the Core of Tort Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 751, 753 (2001)).
56. Franz Werro, Tort Liability for Pure Economic Loss: A Critique of current Trends in Swiss 
Law in CIVIL LIABILITY FOR PURE ECONOMIC LOSS 181, 188 (Efstathios K. Banakas ed., 1996);
47
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Pure-economic losses, however, are not a homogenous concept. They 
can be divided into subgroups in a manner that conceptually could have 
justified a narrower comparison of damages; namely, that between 
indirect-emotional harm and the economic type of loss commonly known 
as “relational economic loss.”57 These forms of damage are similar in that 
they are being caused to third parties consequential to physical injury 
upon the body (emotional harm and economic loss) or property 
(economic loss) of others. However, enumerating types of economic loss 
as divided is not practiced in Anglo-American case law and is barely 
recognized in Israeli case law, both of which use the rhetorical 
generalization of “pure-economic loss.”58 This conceptual rhetorical 
generalization has helped shape the exclusionary rule as applying to all 
types of economic losses, also allowing the pretence of equal treatment 
to be given to economic interests and indirect-emotional harm alike.59
Beyond these rhetorical reasons for comparing between the two harms as 
separate wholes regardless of sub-categories, it seems that their similarity 
asserted prima facie also exists on a substantive level. First, the 
relational economic damage is unique because it deals with the right to 
compensation of someone who has no relationship whatsoever with the 
tortfeasor and in most cases also not with the principal victim himself. 
Therefore, the plaintiff in effect has no legal proximity to the tortfeasor; 
i.e., his injury is not typically one which should have been proximately 
foreseen.60 In contrast, paradigmatically, the indirect-emotional harm 
suffered by the plaintiff is derived from prior familiarity and a close 
Robert Hayes, The Duty of Care and Liability for Purely Economic Loss, 12 MEL. U. L. REV. 79, 97, 
100-102 (1979).
57. Bernstein, supra note 38, at 3. 
58. See, in Israel, RONEN PERRY, PURE ECONOMIC LOSS RESULTING FROM NEGLIGENT 
INFLICTION OF HARM ON THE BODY OR PROPERTY OF A THIRD PARTY 4-5 (Dissertation, served to 
the Hebrew University Senate, 2000) (claiming that although analytically correct and required, in 
effect, dividing the loss into subgroups is typical to academic rather than judicial writing). Gedron 
concludes similarly, indicating that “There is no real distinction between cases where the economic 
loss is direct and cases where it’s indirect. Gedron, supra note 37, at 175.  The same approach is 
apparent in Anglo-American courts. See Bernstein, supra note 37, at 1-23. 
59. PERRY, ibid, at 5, 7. For the tendency to generalize, see Bruce Feldthusen, The Recovery of 
Pure Economic Loss in Canada: Proximity, Justice, Rationality and Chaos in CIVIL LIABILITY FOR 
PURE ECONOMIC LOSS 131, 133-134 (EFSTATHIOS K. BANAKAS EDS., 1996). The tendency to 
generalize is also notable in the Australian case of Perre v. Apand Pty Ltd. (1999) 164 ALR 606. 
60. This difficulty is manifested in the prominent example used by tort scholars, regarding the 
restaurant which is being negligently damaged and closed. Closing the restaurant might financially 
affect the restaurant’s suppliers, whose commodity is not required any more to operate the 
restaurant, what might have additional affect on the latter’s suppliers etc. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE 
LAW OF TORTS 1286-1287 (2000). However, there are rare cases where the connection between the 
primary and secondary victim is more evident and strong, such as in the case where the business 
partner of the plaintiff was negligently harmed, in a way that affects him financially.    
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relation to the primary physically injured person.61 Therefore, such 
plaintiffs could be much more easily foreseen and defined as a limited 
group, based on the assumption that closely related people have loving 
relations; therefore, they are potentially specifically vulnerable to such 
related injury. Second, in economic loss cases where there was a prior 
relationship between the primary victim and the indirect one (the 
plaintiff), the indirect plaintiff could in most cases, roll over his risk, 
placing it on the shoulders of the primary victim or the tortfeasor mainly 
through the use of contractual tools.62 Such contractual action is highly 
problematic in pre-indirect-emotional harm settings where the 
relationship between the primary victim and the plaintiff is emotional, 
and there is no commonly held tradition of, or moral legitimacy for, an a
priori allocation of risks.63
The final difference between the two types of damages exists on a 
symbolic level, whereby in relational economic loss, the plaintiff has no 
interest in the damaged property which caused his loss. The demolition 
of a bridge leading to the plaintiff’s business, condemning it to economic 
paralysis is again, a classic illustration of this notion. Absent a 
proprietary interest in the damaged bridge, the plaintiff is ineligible to 
obtain “traditional” tort-based compensation. Moreover, had the 
destroyed bridge belonged to that same paralyzed business owner, the 
latter would have been entitled to full compensation for these losses as 
resulting from damage to his property. On the other hand, with regard to 
indirect-emotional harm, on the other hand, the familial-personal 
relations of the plaintiff and the primary victim can be reconceptualized 
as a quasi-proprietary relationship, meaning that the plaintiff has an 
“interest” in the primary victim as the product of the love vested in her, 
similar in essence to intellectual property rights and creating what I 
61. Although cases of indirect-emotional harm are frequently referred to as “bystander cases,” 
almost all Anglo-American cases, and all cases in Israeli case law pertained to circumstances where 
the plaintiff has established familial close relations to the direct victim. Currently, “bystander” law is 
perceived as an exception to the non-recovery rule for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
Absurdly enough, though, to become a “bystander,” one should establish being “closely related” to 
the direct victim. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 190 F.3d 959, 961-962 (Ala. 1999); or the 
somewhat oxymoronic provision that “...a bystander plaintiff should be permitted to recover under 
New Jersey law only if she could prove… an intimate familial relationship with the victim…” 
Blinzler v. Marriott Int’l, 81 F.3d 1148, 1154 (NJ, 1996).  
62. The typical case is demonstrated by the example of the fishermen paying to the harbor 
owner for allowing them to use his property for their fishing. 
63. The only preplanned insurance action relevant to the victim here is that of first-party 
insurance, an action which falls outside the realm of risk allocation between the parties involved in 
creating the risk, and is hence an alien to the concept of risk allocation as perceived by tort law. See
JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 205-209 (1992). 
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would term an “emotional property” right.64 Applying this legal 
construction here would make the plaintiff fully eligible for 
compensation under the traditional conditions for establishing proximity 
between the tortfeasor and the plaintiff in negligence claims through 
property rights in the injured subject. 
To summarize, stating that indirect-emotional harm should be compared 
with the subgroup of “relational economic loss” alone is wrong; it stems 
from misleading perceptions of the two losses. The non-compensation 
discourse built around economic loss as a unified set of losses, coupled 
with the substantive differences between relative economic loss and 
indirect-emotional loss, requires a rejection of this initial tendency. 
These characteristics allow us to consider the pure-economic loss in its 
wider sense. 
2. SIMILAR BUT DISTINCT
Notwithstanding the similarities between indirect-emotional harm and 
pure-economic loss, these two losses soon diverge. However, the 
differences dividing them, however, as I shall demonstrate, indicate that 
courts should have preferred recognizing the former as deserving 
protection within negligence law jurisprudence. 
(a) Paradigmatic Content of Tort Law 
Emotional suffering has been acknowledged and relevant since the dawn 
of mankind and certainly since the dawn of tort law; whereas economic 
loss gained substantive significance only with the development of the 
20th century economy. Accordingly, the latter's status would expectedly 
be much shakier than that of the former. Emotional harm reflects basic 
elements of human welfare, whereas economic loss does not have such 
superior qualities.65 Furthermore, in terms of tort law's tradition, broadly 
speaking, we can associate emotional harm with bodily injuries which 
64. This right and morally justified entitlement also has ground in traditional tort law who 
considers family members as having “proprietary” rights in one another. However, the basic 
conception underlying this tradition was patriarchic whereas the one I propose is humane. An 
example for this concept is the humiliating tradition of the per quod servitium amisit claim, which 
allowed the man alone entitlement to compensation for loss of servitude by his “property”: wife, 
child or slave, resulting from the tortfeasor's negligence. JOHN G. FLEMING THE LAW OF TORTS 723-
725 (9th ed., 1998); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 451 (1999). 
65. Patrick Atiyah, one of the social critics of the tort law, thinks that after all tort law is 
preferring protection on body over protection on property. Patrick S. Atiyah, Property Damage and 
Personal Injury – Different Duties of Care? in NEGLIGENCE AND ECONOMIC TORTS 37 (THEO 
SIMONS ED., 1980). See also Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Juror’s Judgments of Business 
Liability in Tort Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 L. & SOC’Y REV. 85 
(1992). 
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are traditionally located at the core of the tort law more strongly than 
property injuries which are associated with economic loss.66 As a result, 
one would expect more “tort empathy” towards emotional suffering. 
(b) The Goals of Tort Law 
Here too, indirect-emotional harm enjoys an advantage arising from an 
unexpected source.67 Viewed from the prism of corrective justice 
approaches to tort law, the type of damage caused to the injured party is 
irrelevant; however, in terms of economic approach to tort law 
(traditionally perceived by feminist theory as reactionary), the type of 
harm caused has a bearing on liability analysis. First, incurring economic 
loss is perceived to be an inherent and rather desirable risk in a healthy 
competitive commercial market.68 Moreover, the injured party's 
economic loss is usually nothing more than the flip side of the coin 
which is the economic profit of another. Therefore, the proponents of this 
theory might be indifferent to such loss: in terms of general welfare and 
“social loss,” once the loss has occurred, the distributive question of 
“who will bear its burden” becomes less significant.69 The elusive 
character of the economic loss also gives rise to a concern that its 
uncertain nature will prevent a proper evaluation of its preventive value.70
In contrast, emotional harm is not the modified converse of the profit of 
the tortfeasor; therefore, it will likely not be perceived as a subrogation 
of benefit between him and his victim. Indeed, it has been asserted that 
emotional harm lacks economic significance; however, this assertion has 
been disproved.71 Furthermore, this damage is considered relevant to the 
66. See, e.g., the words of the Canadian judge Stevenson in Canadian National Railway Co. v. 
Norsk Pacific Steamship Co. Ltd. (1992) 91 DLR (4th) 289, in paragraph 308.   
67. Using the law and economic perspective here is a result of utilitarian rather than 
ideological considerations… 
68. HOWARTH, supra note 54, at 309-310. 
69. Bernstein, supra note 35, at 20; Bishop, Economic Loss in Torts, 2 OXFORD JOUR. LEGAL 
STUD. 1 (1982). This is the Israeli contention as well, as brought by Israel Gilead, Tort Liability in 
Negligence for Pure Economic Loss in ISRAEL REPORTS TO THE XV INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 79, 81 (ALFREDO M. RABELLO ED., 1999). For a counter opinion see STEVEN
SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 136 (1987) (stating that some economic loss 
claims do involve losses of “social welfare”.) For distinguishing between “private” pure-economic 
loss - which lacks a collective meaning, and therefore is not justifiably compensable - and between 
the collective “social” one, and therefore justifiably compensable, see T. Schwartz, The Economic 
Loss Doctrine in American Tort Law: Assessing the Recent Experience, in CIVIL LIABILITY FOR 
PURE ECONOMIC LOSS 103, 127-129 (EFSTATHIOS K. BANAKAS EDS., 1996). See also Gilead, ibid, at 
81. 
70. This might lead to over-deterrence which will paralyze the business market. Gilead, ibid, at 
82. 
71. Stanley Ingber, Alternative Compensation Schemes and Tort Theory: Rethinking Intangible 
Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 772, 799-819 (1985). 
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core economic rationale of tort law such as internalizing the cost of the 
damage and preventing unwanted behavior.72
(c) Conceptual Compatibility with Tort Law 
These two harms are claimed to be equally disfavored by negligence 
jurisprudence because they are intangible which is a trait at odds with 
other traits of tort law. However, characterizing the two harms as 
similarly abstract is inaccurate. The abstract nature of emotional harm 
stems not only from its innate structure, but also from a wider ideological 
rationale, according to which the assets of humanity, as emotions, are not 
tradable and are therefore hard to evaluate.73 In contrast, the abstract 
nature of economic loss ensues, inter alia, from practical rather than 
moral difficulties of evaluating it. These include extra-contractual
relations, detached from a concrete business context and so forth.74 On 
the other hand, contrary to emotional harm, economic loss’s fiscal nature 
renders it more suitable, technically, for fulfilling the restitutio in 
integrum tort maxim by compensating the victim with money, for 
monetary harm. 
(d) Function of the Duty of Care 
Jane Stapleton, who researched the implications of structuring the duty 
of care with regard to economic loss, has argued that when creating a 
duty in negligence, account should be taken not only of the above 
substantial policy considerations but also of structural implications that a 
recognition of a duty to care entails.75 Stapleton criticizes the current 
court practice of using predetermined and–in terms of their definition–
overly broad “liability pockets”, (as in economic loss cases)76 or 
unreasonable or “quasi-tort-law” devices, where their decision is 
allocation based (as in pure-economic loss and indirect-emotional harm 
cases).77 Stapleton proposes the use of parameters that would dictate 
duties of care that are appropriate and consistent, retain the proper 
boundaries of liability in negligence and grant the courts a real anchor for 
72. Ingber, ibid, at 799-819. 
 73. HOWARTH, supra note 54, at 324.
74. HOWARTH, ibid, at 303-306. 
75. Stapleton, supra note 41, at 101.  
76. The over broadness of these “liability pockets” results in two diverse undesirable effects: 
on the one hand, it induces courts to artificially identify a case as belonging to a specific 
compensated category (as her examples in pages 85-86 demonstrate), on the other hand, it prevents 
recognizing justified cases, due to the need to create broad categories of non-liability (as the case of 
Junior Books proves, which could be better handled on a contractual level). Stapleton, ibid, at 90.    
77. Stapleton, ibid, at 85. 
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their judgments. I find Stapleton’s considerations, initially focused on 
pure-economic loss alone, useful to evaluating the structural traits of 
constituting a duty of care for both losses. Stapleton's remarks manifestly 
touch upon the comparison between these losses and indicate that 
recognizing indirect-emotional harm is more conceptually compatible 
with the notion of “duty” in negligence law than pure-economic loss: 
First Criterion: The injured party's ability to protect herself against 
the loss.78 One should not relate here to the injured party's technical 
ability to insure himself, but rather to the significance of the insurance 
and an examination of the actual options which were open to her on the 
matter. This parameter emphasizes the preference given to the 
recognition of indirect-emotional harm against which the injured party 
cannot protect herself except through personal insurance which removes 
any liability from the shoulders of the tortfeasor and therefore has no 
deterrent effect upon him. Moreover, in the case of the emotional indirect 
damage, family and love relations cannot, and should not, commonly be 
subject to such prior management.79 With relation to pure-economic loss 
nevertheless, the injured party generally has control over whether to 
engage in the business relations and interactions which eventually led to 
her damage and how to allocate the risks it entails. A buyer of a house 
can decide who to contract with in a manner that would decrease the 
danger of construction defects. The protective options applicable in these 
cases are also much broader and varied; often they can be expressed in 
contractual stipulations which enable a correct and comprehensive risk 
management in the transaction and the deterrence of those primarily 
negligent actors. Again, the same house buyer can protect herself from 
construction-derived defect costs by contractually stipulating that they be 
incurred by the seller.    
Second Criterion: Preference to linear over peripheral claims. 
Stapleton points to this parameter as one of the most important 
considerations in pure-economic loss cases. Originally and substantively, 
tort law was supposed to enable direct and local claims between 
tortfeasors and their direct victims. It is assumed that suing the direct 
tortfeasor will eventually lead to an action against the primary tortfeasor, 
even if this requires a chain of lawsuits. This stance as well, strengthens 
78. Stapleton, ibid, at 90-91. 
79. HOWARTH, supra note 54, at 238, 254. Howarth suggests considering these relations as 
stemming from deep human commitment for love rather than from free and rational choice. Still, this 
human behavior is common to most of us, and therefore can be identified as irrecoverable, according 
to the reciprocity principle as dictating tort law. See Thomas T. Uhi, Bystander Emotional Distress: 
Missing an Opportunity to Strengthen the Ties that Bind 61 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1399, 1444-1446 
(1995). 
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the status of indirect-emotional harm compared to that of pure-economic 
loss. The relational trait of pure-economic loss carries a risk of incorrect 
identification of the accident's real injured party. In some cases, the 
economically injured party may also receive two-fold compensation. The 
first arises out of some contractually secured preliminary relationships he 
has with the direct injured party. The second arises out of the tort claim 
established against the tortfeasor himself. Additionally, this is the same 
tortfeasor that will probably be found liable for the loss incurred by the 
direct victim. This may even put the indirect injured party in a better 
position than he would have been in but for this damage.  
Consider, for example, A, the business owner from our former example, 
who signs a contract with B to use his bridge as the passageway to his 
restaurant. Using the tort route, A can receive damages from C for the 
economic loss inflicted upon him by shutting his business. Concurrently, 
he can enjoy contractual benefits from B by using the contractual route.80
In contrast, indirect-emotional harm does not bear this kind of risk: the 
injured party alone suffers the damage for which he is being 
compensated.81 Additionally, in pure-economic loss cases, typically there 
is indeed a linear tortfeasor who is negligent and can be sued. Through 
her, other tortfeasors can be reached. Thus, for example, in the purchase 
of a defective house, one can first sue the owner who sold the house to 
the buyers and the seller can sue the construction contractor. In the case 
of indirect-emotional harm, there is almost no room for a claim against 
the primary and direct victim, since he himself was injured in the 
accident. In addition, in the rare cases where the direct victim was also 
responsible for his own injury, the indirectly injured party is generally 
expected to have an emotional barrier to instituting a claim against that 
person who by the very reason of the indirect victim's love for him, was 
the cause of his injury.  
Moreover, in cases of indirect-emotional harm, the main victim acts as 
an “instrument” causing the indirect damage. This is opposed to cases of 
pure-economic loss, where the linear tortfeasor is often a genuine and 
active wrongdoer, sometimes acting as a joint tortfeasor with the 
peripheral wrongdoer, who is not sued for extraneous reasons. For 
example, this is because he is insolvent, or cannot be clearly identified, 
or is contractually exempted from liability. An illustration occurs where 
a lawyer mishandles the sale of a mortgaged house and has the benefit of 
80. Moreover, B here is the primary victim who should, legally speaking, have the power to 
decide whether A should be compensated. HOWARTH, ibid, at 239. 
81. Compensating the secondary emotional victim intends to cover losses that are hers only, 
and which are distinct and different in character from the losses that the primary victim bears.  
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the customarily acquired insurance coverage for his actions, as opposed 
to the owner of a house, who does not have insurance, and hence bears 
more risk in being sued.82
Third Criterion: Preservation of the damage’s initial fall location.83
Stapleton stresses the importance of not establishing a duty which will 
benefit the person who ought to bear the liability by imposing it on 
another. The court should ensure that it is not turned into a tool in the 
hands of the primary victim and tortfeasor for altering the expected 
reasonable understanding as to who should bear the loss. This problem 
does not exist in cases of indirect-emotional harm, where there is no 
other tortfeasor from whom the injured party can obtain compensation 
with no opportunity to manipulate options of compensation. In contrast, 
this problem is known in cases of economic loss, as the above-mentioned 
lawyer example proves. Another prominent example is a case of a 
contractual agreement between the linear parties that no liability would 
be imposed on one of them. Such an agreement practically compels the 
injured party to turn to the peripheral tortfeasor as his last and only resort 
for compensation. 
Fourth Criterion: Protection of negligence law’s “public dignity.”84
Stapleton emphasizes the court's obligation to create duties of care that 
will enjoy public support in order to strengthen the status of tort law in 
society and encourage their continued use by the public. The court 
should therefore refrain from creating embarrassing duties of care which 
contain standards that are incompatible with the life experiences of the 
public. A clear example of these kinds of standards can unfortunately be 
found in the duty of care regarding indirect-emotional harm. Stapleton 
uses the example that a normal loving relationship between family 
members is not sufficient to establish a duty of care so as to give rise to 
an entitlement to compensation for this damage. An infamous example of 
such a ruling is the Alcock case from the English House of Lord’s, where 
the Court refused to regard a relationship between brothers as sufficient 
to establish harm to one of them upon the tragic death of the other.85
82. HOWARTH, supra note 54, at 93. 
83. HOWARTH, ibid, at 94. 
84. HOWARTH, ibid.
85. HOWARTH, ibid, at 95. 
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(e) The Two Losses and the Boundaries of Tort Law 
Pure-economic loss protects economic interests which are protected by 
other legal fields, prominently within the area of contract law.86
Typically, pure-economic loss arises from contractual interactions in 
which the injured party is positioned in a direct or indirect “contractual 
environment” which is closely connected to his loss.87 Accordingly, 
activating tort law and using it to protect economic interests strengthens 
and reinforces the primary contractual protection already benefiting from 
these interests.88 Thus, limited tort protection of economic loss can be 
strongly supported and justified on the ground that it prevents blurring 
the distinction between these branches of law, particularly where it 
unnecessarily widens the application of tort law beyond its traditional 
limits.89 An additional primary concern is that imposing tort liability for 
pure-economic loss would be an inappropriate intervention in the 
contractual relations between the parties. It might violate the balance that 
contract law imposes on the parties, vis-à-vis each other, as expressed by 
the contractual risk-allocation they agreed on.90 Therefore, efforts should 
be made to establish sounder protection mechanisms to economic 
interests in contract law rather than in tort law.91
In contrast, indirect-emotional harm does not receive any preferential 
protection in other fields of law and seemingly is accorded almost no 
protection other than in tort law.92 In Anglo-American law, contractual 
protection of one’s feelings is without a doubt, minor and exceptional to 
86. See, e.g.: ROGERS, supra note 44, at 133:”...most claims for breach of contract involve 
economic loss and nothing else” and “Where commercial loss is suffered by parties to a transaction, 
contract law is adequate to deal with the problem and also usually more appropriate.” Also see
DOBBS, supra note 60, at 1283. 
87. Some even define the loss accordingly: “Economic loss is interference with contractual 
rights and potential business.” HOWARTH, supra note 54, at 267. 
88. A.J.E. JAFFEY, THE DUTY OF CARE 30 (1992). Pure-economic loss usually stems from a 
contractual interaction, whereas physical harm – be it bodily or mentally - usually results from non-
voluntary, non-consensual human interactions. See London Drugs Ltd. v. Kuehn & Nagel 
International Ltd. (1992) 97 DLR (4th) 261, 272-273 (Justice La Forest).  
89. HOWARTH, supra note 54, at 300. The intuitive reason for resisting the expansion of tort 
liability is that it serves as another coercive mean to constrain the autonomy of the person. ALAN 
CALNAN, JUSTICE AND TORT LAW  95 (1997).  
 90. Stapleton, supra note 45, at 271-275, 285-294; COHEN NILLY & FRIEDMAN DANIEL,
CONTRACTS 615-621 (part I, 1991)  (Hebrew); KEETON ET AL., TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW 968-973 
(4th ed. 2004). 
91. Ronen, supra note 37 at 527. 
92. Though limited, protection against indirect-emotional harm is still granted by tort law: “the 
tort system is the only place to which injured people can turn when the non-pecuniary fabric of their 
lives has been torn.” Lucinda M. Finley, Tort Reform: An Important Issue for Women, 2 BU. W. J. L.
& SOC. POL. 10, 14 (1993). 
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the recognized economic context within which they operate.93 Israel as 
well lacks equivalent contractual protection of feelings.94 Awarding 
compensation for non-pecuniary loss is highly limited and rarely used.95
Emotional harm is compensated in contract law as a loss which is 
secondary in importance, collateral to the economic loss, and requires 
that some contractual interaction generate the harm. Moreover, using tort 
law to protect economic and commercial relations seems to fall outside 
their natural purpose which is the protection of the corporal and property 
interests of individuals. Indeed, the use of tort law in pure-economic loss 
cases represents a highly problematic intervention in the balance created 
by contract law in these respects.96
3. SUMMARY
The points of similarity and difference between indirect-emotional harm 
and pure-economic loss increase the feminist interest in investigating 
their course of recognition. Indirect-emotional harm has had a better 
legal starting point than pure-economic loss, particularly bearing in mind 
that the argument that it might encourage frivolous claims to overburden 
the system, was rejected as groundless.97 Therefore, it might have been 
hypothetically expected that this loss would gain faster and easier 
recognition compared with economic loss. A contrary discovery suggests 
that these losses possess a gendered “added value” (or “reducing value”) 
causing them to develop in a way other than expected.  This added value 
can generate one-dimension discrimination as argued by the first tier 
feminist critique of tort law, or two-dimension discrimination, whereby 
preference is given to the male-related economic interest by granting it 
over-protection that is also stronger than the protection granted to 
female-related emotional interest. 
93. NICHOLAS J. MULLANY & PETER R. HANDFORD, TORT LIABILITY FOR PSYCHIATRIC 
DAMAGE 51-56 (1993) (discussing the contractual protection of emotions); Douglas J. Whaley, 
Paying for the Agony: The Recovery of Emotional Distress Damages in Contract Actions, 26
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 935 (1992). This is also the position stated at RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 353 (1981), which provides that recovery for emotional disturbance will be excluded 
in the absence of the circumstances of bodily harm or when the contract or breach is such that 
serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely to result. 
94. Article 13 to the Israeli Contracts Act (Remedies for breach of Contract), 1970 states: “has 
the breach of the contract caused non-pecuniary harm, the court may order compensation to the 
plaintiff in a sum to be determined by his context-based nuanced discretion.” (1970) L.S.I. (Laws of 
the State of Israel) 16.  
95. Courts indicate that this article should be activated only in rare and extreme circumstances. 
See, e.g., DC 360/99 Cohen v. The State of Israel (2002), SC 3437/93; Eged v. Adler 54 P.D.(i) 817, 
836 (1998) (Hebrew). 
96. HOWARTH, supra note 54, at 267; Gedron, supra note 37, at 183. 
97. See BITTON, supra note 14, at 81-82, 94-95.  
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The fact that the two losses share many similar traits with respect to their 
unnaturalness as the subjects of negligence law protection on the one 
hand, and that they diverge in a manner which should have benefited 
indirect-emotional harm over pure-economic loss, on the other hand, 
strengthens their comparison against possible objection. True, there can 
be other variables that have influenced the way the courts have 
constructed their limited recognition of these losses. Some, for example, 
have contended that the emotional harm is hard to evaluate, whereas 
economic loss is easier to predict and prove.98 However, notwithstanding 
this possible objection, most of the distinctive and “problematic” traits of 
these losses and the concerns that they raise have been presented here in 
detail and are therefore recognized in my argument and incorporated into 
it. Furthermore, no other scholarly argument exists today that has 
undertaken to compare the two losses at any rate other than the one 
presented here. Confining my argument to the feminist traits of these two 
losses, the comparison seems established and justified regardless of some 
possible other influences on the recognition path these two losses bear.   
PART III: ECONOMIC LOSS AND INDIRECT EMOTIONAL HARM: 
A COMPARATIVE GAZE ON BOUNDARIES AND 
RECOGNITION99
1. ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW
(a) Economic Loss 
Tort liability for economic loss, which is not pure but rather 
accompanying or collateral to other physical harm, has been recognized 
since the dawn of time.100 The recognition of pure-economic loss which 
is independent, stemming alone from the wrong, has existed in traditional 
torts such as breach of contract and deceit.101 The difficulty in 
compensating for pure-economic loss arises only when one seeks its 
protection under the tort of negligence. Negligence law imposes liability 
for all types of behaviors which are regarded as creating an unreasonable 
and foreseeable risk. This broad definition allows negligence law’s 
protection to encompass injury caused to a circle of people broader and 
98. Arguably, economic loss’s fiscal nature renders it more suitable, technically, for fulfilling 
the restitutio in integrum tort maxim by compensating the victim with money, for monetary harm. 
99. For further analysis in the subject of economic loss in general, and in the Anglo-American 
law in particular, see CANE, supra note 12; Stapleton, supra note 45. 
100. SALMOND & HEUSTON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 206 (HEUSTON R.F.V. & BUCKLEY R.A.
EDS., 21st ed., 1996). 
101. Howarth, supra note 54, at 474 (breach of contract), 275 (deceit). These injustices are 
characterized as “intentional torts”. 
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more remote than the direct and commonly known circle of injured 
people in tort law.102 It is therefore the natural legal refuge for a person 
suffering indirect economic injury to seek compensation for his loss from 
a third party.103
The common law tradition has established a “no liability,” non-recovery 
rule in negligence for economic loss.104 Although it is hard to point to a 
single case which shaped the rule, the rule already arose from a number 
of decisions made mainly by English and American courts.105 It is also 
prevalent in other common-law systems.106
In England, the decision in Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners107 is 
considered the first to recognize economic loss for negligent 
misstatement. Hedley was perceived as having created an exception to 
the traditional rule of non-compensation108 and as having limited 
precedential value, being relevant only to the unique context in which it 
was considered.109 Still, this case launched a wave of recognition of 
causes that had been rejected in the past and of new emerging causes for 
pure-economic loss.110 A more sweeping acceptance of pure-economic 
loss was reached only by the end of the 1970’s. In Anns v. Merton,111 the 
House of Lords formally and officially recognized the possibility of 
imposing liability in negligence for pure-economic loss.112 This case was 
followed by the important ruling of Junior Books v. Veitchi,113 which 
102. Ronen, supra note 37, at 505. 
103. COHEN AND FRIEDMAN, supra note 90, at 173-184. The authors also do not distinguish 
between different categories of economical loss. 
104. People Express Airlines Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, 100 N.J. 246, 251 (NJ 
1985) (stating that American and English courts have “a virtually, per se rule barring recovery for 
economic loss”); Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A 
Reassessment, 37 STAN. LR 1513 (1985); Howarth, supra note 54, at 267. 
105. BRUCE FELDTHUSEN, ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE 5 (4th ed., 2000) (American law); Patrick S. 
Atiyah, Negligence and Economic Loss, 83 L.Q. REV. 248, 248-256 (1967) (English law). 
106. See THE LIMITS OF EXPANDING LIABILITY, supra note 39, at 69-72 (Austria), 129-130 
(Greece), 137-143 (Italy), 157-158 (The Netherlands), 190-191 (Sweden). These different legal 
systems adopted a non-recovery rule similar in scope to that shaped by the Common-law. 
107. Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners [1964] AC 465 HL. 
108. Atiya thus analyzes this case at Atiya, supra note 105, at 258-265. 
109. Stapleton, supra note 45, at 260-261. 
110. See the review of the adjudication in the field at FELDTHUSEN, supra note 105105, at 8. 
111. Anns, supra note 53. 
112. Though relating to the issue of buildings' physical safety, the case is perceived as relating 
to the issue of economic loss, since the building's safety required that the plaintiff use and hence lose 
their money in order to fix the building.   
113. Junior Books v. Veitchi, [1983] 1 AC 520 HL. Though initially perceived as central to 
economic loss theory, the case was later described as a case that “...cannot be regarded as laying 
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established the test for accountability that would eventually become the 
source for generally shaping the duty of care for negligence in the UK.114
However, the Anns rule did not survive for long; after problematic 
applications, it was finally rescinded by the House of Lords in Murphy v. 
Brentwood District Council115 which shaped the currently prevailing rule 
regarding economic loss. Today, the imposition of liability for pure-
economic loss is guided by the need to examine each case on its own 
merits and determine the duty of care required in light of the appropriate 
policy considerations. Therefore, the duty of care in relation to economic 
loss is imposed only if the court is persuaded that it would be just, 
logical, appropriate and reasonable to do so.116 An exception to this rule 
is the recognition of economic losses that are based upon negligent 
misstatement, misrepresentation or professional negligence, where 
liability is more easily imposed.117
Tort case law in the U.S. proved less dominant in this area by simply 
following its English counterpart. One can generalize about the 
development of the different categories of pure-economic loss and state 
that this form of damage followed a course similar to the English one, 
where a denial of compensation demanded the beginning of the century, 
a limited recognition was established during the 1960's,118 endured 
through the 1970's,119 and has undergone a problematic expansion which 
finally led to the current regression in recognition.120
The leading case to establish the non-recovery rule of no liability in 
negligence for pure-economic loss was Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. 
Flint.121 Despite this general rule however, some cases have imposed 
liability for negligent interference with purely economic interests. 
down any principle of general application in the law of tort”. See D&F Estates Ltd v. Church 
Commissioners Ltd., [1989] AC 177 HL, 202.  
114. The impact this case had on negligence analysis was enormous. See Lord Wilberforce's 
reflection in Murphy v. Brentwood District Council, [1990] 2 All E.R. 908, 924-925. 
115. Murphy, ibid.
116. Caparo, supra note 53, at 585. 
117. In these cases a strong assumption of liability is established by the negligent party vis-à-vis 
the claimant; FELDTHUSEN, supra note 105, at 4. 
118. Feldthusen's perception of the Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 274 (Cal. 1922) case as the 
first to recognize misrepresentation has no further academic support. FELDTHUSEN, ibid, at 5. Dobbs, 
for example, identifies as such the case of Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303; 
DOBBS, supra note 60.   
119. The leading case is Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F. 2d 558 (1973) where the court awarded 
compensation to fishermen claiming loss of future benefits. These were caused by contamination to 
their fishing water by the defendant's negligent water pollution. 
120. A detailed review of case law regarding this issue is provided by DOBBS, supra note 60, at 
1282-1287 and Schwartz, supra note 69, at 104-114. 
121. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927); DOBBS, ibid, at 1284. 
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Moreover, some statutes have imposed liability for pure-economic loss, 
most notably in the statute regarding oil spills in navigable waters.122
Additionally, in a few cases the courts have proposed a general 
modification of the non-recovery rule. In the seminal case, People 
Express,123 the defendant was allegedly negligent in the management of 
highly dangerous chemicals. The area nearby had to be evacuated,  
including the plaintiff's airlines office, had to be evacuated, resulting in 
loss of profits and business operations for the airlines. Importantly, the 
dangerous chemicals caused no physical harm. The New Jersey Supreme 
Court concluded that the general rule against liability was incorrect and 
held that the defendant would owe a duty of reasonable care to protect 
against economic loss when “particular plaintiffs or plaintiffs comprising 
an identifiable class” have suffered stand-alone economic loss, provided 
the defendant knew or had reason to know that such harm was likely to 
occur.124 In a prior, much looser opinion, a federal court has also favored 
a general regime of negligence liability for economic loss.125
Notwithstanding these cases, today courts generally hold that there is no 
duty to protect against negligent interference with purely economic 
interests.126 The Second and Third Restatements of Torts have adopted a 
clear non-recovery rule for relative economic loss.127
(b) Indirect-Emotional Harm 
Only towards the last third of the previous century was indirect-
emotional harm systematically recognized in Anglo-American law. Here 
it was the American legal system that led the way in 1968 when it 
recognized the duty of care toward an indirect-emotionally injured party 
for the first time. In Dillon v. Legg,128 the Supreme Court of California 
 122. 33 U.S.C.A para. 2702 (b) (2) (E). There is also a federal statue, the Medical Care 
Recovery Act, which allows the federal government to recover its expenses in treating a member of 
the armed forces who is injured by a tortfeasor. See 42 U.S.C.A para. 2651. 
123. People Express, supra note 104.  
124. People Express, ibid, at 116. Alaska has at least partially approved this idea. See Mattingly 
v. Sheldon Jackson College, 743 P.2d 356 (Alaska 1987). 
125. Petitions of Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.1968). See also DOBBS, supra note 
60, at 1285-1286. 
126. TORT LAW AND PRACTICE 415 (Dominick Vetri et al., eds., 3rd ed. 2006). See also, Anita 
Bernstein, Keep it Simple: An Explanation of the Rule of No Recovery for Pure Economic Loss, 48 
ARIZ. L. REV. 773 (2006). 
127. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (products liability limited to 
“physical harm” to user or consumer, or their property); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 21, 
comment d (2007) (“[A] defective product may destroy a commercial business establishment, whose 
employees patronize a particular restaurant, resulting in economic loss to the restaurant. The loss 
suffered by the restaurant generally is not recoverable in tort and in any event is not cognizable 
under products liability law.”).
128. Dillon, supra note 53. 
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recognized a mother's rights for compensation for her emotional harm 
upon watching her little girl die in an accident. The Court decided to 
depart from the “danger zone” rule which had dominated these cases, 
denouncing it as an egoistic rule compensating only those who were so 
concerned about their own safety and not for the safety of another.129 The 
Court's invigorating suggestion was to examine the liability issue within 
the traditional framework of the duty of care, including the application of 
its foreseeability and proximity tests–structured in the general law of the 
tort of negligence.130 The Court recommended assessing the reasonable 
foreseeability of the damage according to three factors: 1) the degree of 
proximity of the plaintiff to the zone of the accident, in terms of time and 
place;131 2) her means of perceiving the accident; 3) the degree of 
personal closeness between the plaintiff and the primary victim.132 The 
parameters were defined by the Court with the sole intention of 
providing guidelines for assessing reasonable foreseeability rather than 
being preliminary conditions for liability. It was also held that decisions 
in future cases would not be made on the basis of strict principles but 
rather on a case by case developmental course customary in common-
law.133
The California Supreme Court followed Dillon for two decades until 
declaring, in Thing v. La Chusa,134 that the recovery rule it had set based 
on “reasonable foreseeability” was too broad.135 Reassessing Dillon, the 
Court held that it provided virtually no limit on liability for nonphysical 
harm.136 Its worrisome alternative shamelessly stated that “drawing 
129. Thus, the suffering of the sister of the victim who played next to her would be recognized, 
but the suffering of the mother who stood far from her at the accident, would not be recognized; 
Dillon, ibid, at 915. 
130. “We see no good reason why the general rules of Tort law, including the concepts of 
negligence proximate cause and foreseeability long applied to all other types of injury should not 
govern the case now before us and … mechanical rules of thumb which are at variance with these 
principles do more harm than good” Dillon, ibid, at 924. 
131. This requirement signified the desertion of the former demand that the plaintiff be present 
at the danger zone of the accident. The court subsequently settles for presence in the accident's 
“aftermath” scene, whereby the impact of the accident is still evident in the plaintiff's injured (or 
dead) relatives. Dillon, ibid, at 922. 
132. The court decided that a mere “bystander” who has no family relation to the victims should 
not be considered entitled to compensation. Dillon, ibid, at 920-921. 
133. “We cannot now predetermine defendant's obligation in every situation by a fixed 
category... We can, however, define guidelines... The evaluation of these factors will indicate the 
degree of the defendant's foreseeability... In light of these factors the court will determine whether 
the accident and harm was reasonably foreseeable... courts, on a case-to-case basis, analyzing all the 
circumstances, will decide...” Dillon, ibid, at 920-921. 
 134. Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644 (1989). 
135. Thing, ibid, at 663-664. 
136. Thing, ibid, at 663. 
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arbitrary lines are unavoidable if we are to limit liability…”137
Accordingly, the criteria for liability imposition in similar cases were 
further limited.138 Nevertheless, a number of jurisdictions continue to 
apply the foreseeability rule in Dillon, rejecting the limitations 
subsequently established by Thing.139 Today, all jurisdictions allow 
negligent infliction of indirect-emotional suffering claims but they all set 
very strong limitations.140 In fact, no jurisdiction has succeeded in 
establishing a coherent and comprehensive rule for these claims.141
It was not until 1983 when the English legal system took a step quite 
similar to the American legal system. In McLoughlin v. O'Brian,142 the 
plaintiff's husband and three children were involved in a car accident. 
About an hour after the accident occurred, the plaintiff arrived at the 
hospital where she discovered the enormity of the disaster, causing her 
“severe shock, organic depression and a change of personality.”143 Being 
outside the “zone of the danger,” the plaintiff was ineligible for 
compensation. The House of Lords adopted the Dillon ruling and 
recognized the mother's right to compensation despite the fact that she 
was outside the zone of danger. Lord Wilberforce, writing for the 
majority, based his entire decision on the foreseeability test within the 
general duty of care in negligence law. His decision specifically called 
for the use of the basic rule of adjudication in the common-law whereby 
a logical development is pursued from case to case while preserving the 
boundaries of the legal principle underlying the leading case in the 
area.144 Reviewing the guiding principles in the Dillon case, Lord 
Wilberforce has softened most of them but without replacing them with 
137. Thing, ibid, at 666. 
138. The entitlement became limited to cases where the said plaintiff: (1) is closely related to 
the injury victim as to share a household or be being parents, siblings, children or grandparents of 
the victim; (2) is present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then 
aware that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional distress- a 
reaction beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested  witness and which is not an 
abnormal response to the circumstances.” Thing, ibid, at 668. 
139. VETRI, LEVINE, VOGEL AND FINLEY, TORT LAW AND PRACTICE  316 (3rd ed. 2006). 
140. See Clohessy v. Bachelor, 675 A.2d 852 (Conn. 1996), where the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut preferred Thing's factors over Dillon's, adding a prerequisite of death or serious injury 
caused to the primary victim. New York rejects Dillon as a yardstick, it still adheres to the “zone of 
physical danger” rule for even the immediate family members of the victim. See Bovsun v. Sanperi,
461 N.E.2d 843 (N.Y.1984). 
141. DIAMOND, LEVINE AND MADDEN, UNDERSTANDING TORTS 151 (at footnote 22) (3rd ed. 
2007).  
142. McLoughlin v. O’Brian, [1983] 1 A.C. 410.  
143. McLoughlin, ibid, at 416-417. Lord Wilberforce elaborated the hurtful facts of the case in a 
nontraditional manner that revealed his human empathy for the plaintiff. 
144. McLoughlin, ibid, at 417-419. 
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new “guiding rules.”145 Lord Bridge, concurring, also warned against the 
rigidity of these rules as creating arbitrary boundaries between different 
cases, all equally justified.146 He suggested that these rules be used to 
assess the extent of the foreseeability of the damage ultimately caused to 
the plaintiff and not as a measure for determining whether there was a 
duty and liability towards the plaintiff.147 Despite the positive nature of 
this decision, its “golden era” ended toward the close of the century in 
England. Most notably, this turn has been taken at the Alcock v. Chief 
Constable of S. Yorkshire case,148 discussing the claims of indirect 
plaintiffs who were the loved-ones of the victims of the notorious 
collapse of the Hillsborough Football Stadium. In this ruling, the House 
of Lords was able to “clarify” and delimit the boundaries of McLoughlin,
mainly by drawing a distinction between first and secondary (indirect) 
injured parties whereby the latter’s right for compensation was confined 
to strict limitations.149 Further limitations were applied by requiring that 
the injury be sustained through a sudden shock and that the plaintiffs, if 
not bearing “closest family ties” (namely, spouses and parent-children) 
with the direct victim, show specific emotional attachment to her.150 As a 
result, the fair use of the foreseeability doctrine was eventually 
abandoned in favor of rigid rules which created arbitrary distinctions 
between equally eligible victims.151
(c) Has Second Tier Feminist Analysis Proved Two-Dimension 
Discrimination in Anglo-American Tort Law? 
The review of Anglo-American attitudes towards indirect-emotional 
harm and pure-economic loss reveals a rather balanced picture. Even 
though courts were consistently reluctant to compensate properly for 
indirect-emotional harm, they were only slightly less restrictive in 
protecting purely financial interests of plaintiffs. Independently, this 
finding could be read as implying a lack of gender-based adherence to 
145. Setting the “aftermath” doctrine was, as previously mentioned, the most substantial method 
of softening the preliminary requirements in these indirect-emotional harm cases. McLoughlin, ibid,
at 422. 
146. McLoughlin, ibid, at 442. 
147. McLoughlin, ibid, at 442-443. The controversy between the majority justices revolved 
around the question of whether the duty of care in these cases should be designed according to the 
general idea of foreseeability or rather by the newly set rules. See RICHARD KIDNER, CASEBOOK ON 
TORTS 146 (5th ed. 1998).  
148. Alcock v. Chief Constable of S. Yorkshire, 3 WLR 1057 [1991]. 
149. Alcock, ibid, at 1103, 1105, 1110. Further endorsement of this distinction was held at Page 
v. Smith,[1995] 2 All ER 736 HL 
150. Alcock, ibid, at 1102. More specifically, the court has refused considering siblings eligible 
for compensation in this respect. See, e.g., Alcock, ibid, at 1083-1087. 
151. See BITTON, supra note 14, at 99-100. 
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one interest over the other. Read against the losses’ comparative context, 
however, the finding should be viewed as reflecting the one dimension 
discrimination against indirect-emotional harm which, as was 
hypothesized, should have had the upper hand in being more easily 
embraced into tort law. With regards to pure-economic loss, the non-
recovery rule seems to fit more easily and naturally than its lower 
starting-point.152 Furthermore, the courts’ usage of similar explanatory 
discourse in justifying the two losses’ “shared destiny” as deserving an 
“exclusionary rule” of non-liability which largely ignored their inherent 
differences, strongly supports this proposition as well. Nonetheless, the 
findings do not strongly support, nonetheless, the counter postulation that 
negligence law carries, simultaneously, a second dimension of 
discrimination. Namely, that tort law over-protects male-related interests. 
In this respect, the holistic feminist analysis of Anglo-American 
negligence law demonstrates that a bias against feminine interests within 
a fixed setting does not necessarily entail a counter bias privileging male 
interests153.
Seeking further resources from which to draw on the significance of the 
gendered nature of these interests within negligence law regardless of the 
seemingly balanced picture laid-out by Anglo-American law, I have 
decided to proceed to a second comparative dimension, where Anglo-
American and Israeli negligence law will be compared with respect to 
indirect-emotional harm and economic loss.     
2. ISRAELI LAW 
Israel’s tort law domain is paradigmatically common-law, reflecting and 
embracing the general conceptions and specific legal doctrines of Anglo-
America.154 Structured along the lines of the British Empire’s colonial 
legal regime, the Israeli Tort Ordinance—the primary authoritative 
source of tort adjudication—practically functions as a legal 
152. This conclusion should be read as limited to the comparative perspective of this loss vis-à-
vis indirect-emotional loss. It does not imply a normative stance as to the extent to which this loss 
should be recognized by virtues of its own importance. 
153. Notwithstanding this disposition, a broader view of tort law and contract law as united 
points of reference, however, strongly supports the supposition that gender bias dimensions are 
twofold, namely, that along with discriminating against female-related interests, the law 
discriminates in favor of male-related interests. This bias is encompassed in realizing the strong 
protection allowed by contract law to economic interests, that coupled with the minimal shield it 
offers emotional harm, strengthens the position of pure-economic loss, while leaving the indirect-
emotional harm at its inferior position. 
154. Menachem Mautner, Rules and Standards in the New Israeli Civil Code – The 
Jurisprudence of Legislation, 18 MISHPATIM LR 321 (1998) (Hebrew).  
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transplantation within the Israeli legal system.155 Consequently, the 
formal basis for comparing these legal systems is well established. At the 
same time, unveiling the differences between these two systems will 
enable us to identify and understand the impact of gender-bias legal 
transplantations. In turn, we can evaluate and analyze them more 
compellingly. The comparative analysis serves in this article as a tool to 
evaluate the feminist contention that common-law tort law is 
androcentric and that it perceives interests as gender-related.  
My hypothesis is that gender biased doctrines of one system, once 
transplanted in another, would adapt the patterns of gender bias 
characteristic of the latter’s legal system. Being a legal implantation 
within Israeli law, the Anglo-American doctrines regarding both these 
interests are expected to have adjusted to their new legal surroundings by 
adapting to the local “receptors” of the gendered perceptions they 
represent and adopt their mannerisms.  
This comparative analysis is therefore meant to problematize the 
seemingly balanced picture presented in Anglo-American law since the 
Israeli case presents a much different picture, whereby three dimensions 
of discrimination within this realm can be identified. It therefore distorts 
the seemingly balanced picture revealed by Anglo-American law and 
reveals indirect-emotional harm as well as economic loss as carrying 
strong gendered attributes that influence their respective recognition. My 
contention is that acting as legal implants, the gendered traits in these 
losses—be they latent, as in the case of pure-economic loss, or vibrant, 
as in the case of indirect economic harm—were enhanced within the 
Israeli context for reasons I will discuss at the last part of this article.   
(a) Economic Loss 
In Israeli law, economic loss has been approached differently than in 
Anglo-American law. A meticulous examination of the different stages 
of development of this doctrine shows that courts in Israel which were 
strict about preserving the boundaries of the indirect-emotional harm 
tended to breach substantial boundaries whenever they concerned 
economic loss. These breaches also stood in sharp contrast to the main 
restrictions imposed on this loss in common-law, to which Israeli law 
155. The Tort Ordinance of 1964 is an approximate translation of the 1922 Cyprusian 
Ordinance which embodied the main principles of the common-law tort law imposed on Cyprus by 
the British Empire mandate. The Cyprusian ordinance has been applied as the law of the land in 
Palestine through the British Empire’s Mandate and was incorporated to the Israeli state upon its 
establishment. See Gad Tedeschi and Andre Rosenthal, THE TORT ORDINANCE, ITS FORMATION AND 
HISTORICAL SOURCES V-IV (1963) (Hebrew).   
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was bound at that time. In most cases, breaching was practiced without 
an explicit notice of Israeli courts, thereby de-dramatizing its 
significance.  
This extremity is most evident in light of the most traditional restrictions 
that were set for liability for pure-economic loss in common-law 
tradition: First, as mentioned, common-law tort law as opposed to 
contract law, has not been shaped to deal with losses linked to relations 
and negotiations. Rather, it is concerned with losses which occur in a 
sudden manner between strangers and which raise problems of harm, not 
of business bargaining.156 Consequently, in cases involving contractual 
relations between some of the parties any intervention and expansion of 
the contractual setting by tort law was unwelcome.157 These crucial 
worries, however, were not even discussed by Israeli courts when they 
imposed liability in negligence for economic loss even when contractual 
relations existed between the parties to the tort dispute.158 More than 
once, this approach led Israel’s Supreme Court to impose liability for 
pure-economic loss even when its decision countered a contractual 
clause, clearly interfering in the contractual balance agreed upon by the 
parties to the tort dispute.159
Undoubtedly, the main departure Israeli law has taken from Anglo-
American law relates to the former’s recognition of “relative pure-
economic loss” as compensable. Anglo-American tort law has been 
relatively strict with its non-recognition of this loss, whereas Israeli law 
has shown signs of recognition even in this highly controversial area.160
Moreover, even in relation to the common-law’s acknowledged 
exception to this no-liability rule, namely when the pure-economic loss is 
a consequence of negligent misrepresentation and misstatement, the 
156. Feldthusen, supra note 59, at 168.  
157. For the numerous reasons and justifications for distinguishing tort liability from 
contractual circumstances see COLEMAN, supra note 63. A great example for this difficulty is the 
English verdict in the case of Leigh & Sullivan Ltd. V. Aliakmon Shipping Co. Ltd., [1985] 1 Q.B. 
350 HL The verdict was approved by the House of Lords in [1986] 1 AC 785. Also see the court's 
words in the case of Margarine Union G.M.B.H. v. Cambay Prince Steamship Co. Ltd., [1969] 1 
Q.B. 219, 252 :“[I]t is wrong to introduce into the law of tort the concept of passing of risk between 
buyer and the seller under a contract for the sale of goods.” 
158. Gedron, supra note 37, at 139-144; DOBBS , supra note 60, at 1283. 
159. See the precedence setting decisions at SC 106/54 Weinstein v. Kadima, 8 P.D. 1317 
(1954) (Hebrew) (the contract set the liability of the defendant (an engineer) vis-à-vis the third party 
which ordered the professional work from him. Court allowed the builder  to sue the engineer for the 
former’s economic loss); SC 86/76 Amidar v. Aharon, 32 P.D.(ii) 337 (1978) (Hebrew) (the court 
overcomes, using the tort claim, a contractual provision exempting the defendant of any future 
claims of damage regarding the contract). 
160. SC 593/81 Ashdod Vehicle Factory v. Chizic 41 P.D.(iii) 169 (1987) (Hebrew); Weinstein,
ibid.
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course of recognizing liability in Anglo-American law has been 
regulated, restrained and even hesitant.161 This description also diverges 
from the highly advanced and still expanding process of recognition of 
this set of losses in Israeli law, as demonstrated by a comprehensive 
research of this liability and its formation and development in Israeli 
adjudication.162 The research concludes that during this process, the 
courts displayed a consistent trend towards narrowing the interpretation 
of the basic principles restricting liability which had been established at 
the first case to decide on pure-economic loss–the Weinstein case–
thereby gradually broadening the liability in the area.163 According to the 
research, this judicial trend will continue using negligent 
misrepresentation cases as a vehicle to abandon the cautious, 
conservative and hesitant rules found in the common-law.164 There, 
negligent misrepresentation was shaped as an exception to the rule 
denying liability for pure-economic loss; whereas in Israel, it was 
practically set as the new order165.
Israeli negligence law’s deviation from Anglo-American law is 
revolutionary in yet another respect. In most cases in which the liability 
for pure-economic loss was restricted in Anglo-American law this was to
place another stone in the dam preventing the tort floodgate from 
bursting due to unwanted imposition of liability.166 In Israeli law as well, 
imposing liability for economic loss almost always arose in a factual 
setting that entailed additional policy considerations and difficulties. 
Nonetheless, not only it did not discourage the courts from imposing 
liability but rather, in numerous cases, imposition of liability was a 
means for a significant break from prevailing restrictions on negligence 
liability. Pure-economic loss has therefore functioned as a catalyst for 
161. MARGARET BRAZIER, JOHN MURPHY EDS, STREET ON TORTS 215 (10th. ed. 1999). 
162. Gilead, supra note 69. Gilead examines a forty-five year development in light of the main 
measurements determined for limiting the liability back in the Weinstein case: The foreseen 
reasonable reliance of the plaintiff, the special relations between the two parties and the assumption 
of liability on the side of the defendant.  
163. For example, in the cases of Amidar, supra note 159 and SC 783/83 Kaplan v. Novogrotzky
P.D. 38(iii) 477 (1984) (Hebrew), the court has waived the prerequisite of the adviser being a 
professional. In SC 790/81 American Microsystems Inc v. Elbit Systems P.D. 39(ii) 785 (1985) 
(Hebrew), the court waived the prerequisite of the defendant knowing the identity of the potential 
person to whom the information is designed, and knowing the purpose for which the information 
was given to. 
164. Gedron, supra note 37, at 171-172. 
165. Gilead, supra note 69, at 126. 
166. The Murphy case, for example, raised the issues of public authorities' liability and the 
liability for omission in negligence, on top of the issue of the loss being purely economic:  “The 
critical question... is not the nature of the damage in itself...” Lord Oliver, Murphy, supra note 114, 
at 933. Some consider these issues as the main shapers of the non-recovery rule; ROGERS, supra note 
4439, at 133. 
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revolutionary decisions. For example, liability for economic loss was 
imposed even when it required applying it to public authorities as an 
exception to the then prevailing standard of granting substantial 
immunity to governmental authorities.167 Another example occurred just 
recently when pure-economic loss was used as a tool for breaching a 
clear boundary of the duty of care in imposing liability for a loss 
consequential upon pursuing legitimate legal proceedings. In Trade Inc. 
v. Shalom Weinstein Company Inc.,168 the plaintiff won recovery for 
pure-economic loss he bore by the defendant due to their former mutual 
involvement in civil proceedings whereby the latter neglected to apply 
for an interim order of attachment to secure the outcome of a judgment.169
The case was grounded, inter alia, in misrepresentation on the part of the 
defendant, thereby breaking through the last boundaries placed on the 
imposition of liability for a negligent misrepresentation, which had 
previously been restricted to acts performed in a business context alone. 
As opposed to the traditional analysis of misrepresentation requiring the 
plaintiff's reliance on the display as a main measurement for imposing 
liability, the Court in Trade, rather than the defendant itself, was the one 
who relied on the false statement presented by the defendant, thereby 
causing loss to the plaintiff.170
(b) Indirect-emotional Harm 
Constructing a narrow duty of care for indirect-emotional harm, Israeli 
Law has made problematic use of rules developed in Anglo-American 
case law in this area. In 1958, in Stern v. Shamir the first opportunity was 
offered to the Israeli Supreme Court to discuss pure emotional loss, 
identified as “nervous shock”.171 In this case, a mother, whose son had 
167. Monumental decisions are SC 209/85 Kiryat-Ata Municipality v. Ilanco LTD P.D. 42(i) 
190 (1988) (Hebrew); SC 324/82 Bnei-Brak Municipality v. Rothberg P.D. 45(iv) 102 (1991) 
(Hebrew). The recent most significant case to endorse the imposition of liability on local public 
authority for pure-economic loss is SC 653/97 Baruch and Zipora Center Co. v. Tel-Aviv-Jaffa 
Municipality P.D. 53(v) 817 (1999) (Hebrew), where liability in negligence was imposed on the 
urban planning authority for dragging its feet in granting building permission to land owners. The 
owner was compensated for the financial benefits he could have earned, if the permission was given 
on time.  
168. SC 1565/95 Trade and See Services LTD. v. Weinstein Co. LTD, P.D. 54(v) 638 (2000) 
(Hebrew). This circumstantial context was previously declared as having no ground of raising tort 
liability. See SC 572/74 Roytman v. United Eastern Bank LTD P.D. 29(ii) 57 (1975) (Hebrew) and 
SC 735/75 Roytman v. Aderet P.D. 30(iii) 75 (1976) (Hebrew). 
169. The Court's decision was put more narrowly: “…should a plaintiff, asking for temporary 
seizure injunction, is under a duty of care to the defendant, not to harm him financially while doing 
so?”; Trade, ibid, at 647. 
170. The only boundary on such claims was set by one Justice, who has added the requirement 
that the tortfeasor be extremely reckless. 
171. SC 294/54 Stern v. Shamir, P.D. 12(i) 421 (1958). 
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drowned in a cesspit due to the defendant's negligence sued for 
compensation for the emotional harm she suffered due to her son’s 
death.172 Her suit was dismissed by the trial court on the ground of 
diagnosing her emotional condition as “nervousness and hysteria” which 
the Court did not consider “mental illness.”173 The Israeli Supreme Court 
affirmed and added the requirement of physical manifestation of pure 
emotional harm. It held that in Israeli case law, emotional harm is not
subject to compensation unless it leads to bodily injury or a notable 
illness.174 An additional ground for denying compensation, set as a duty 
policy consideration was that it was inconceivable to allow recognition 
of injury to a party whose harm arose from hearing of the disaster rather 
than witnessing it. The Court reasoned its non-recognition by referring to 
prevailing English case law on the issue.175
After a history of rejecting claims for indirect-emotional harm176 (22 
years after American law and a decade after English law), this harm was 
first recognized by the Israeli Supreme Court in 1990, in Al-Socha v. The 
Estate of the late David Dahan.177 After engaging in a detailed review of 
the history of recognizing this loss under common-law, the Court 
decided to introduce a new “secondary duty of care” towards these 
indirect injured parties within Israeli tort law.178 However, when 
establishing the duty the Court was very careful to delineate its 
boundaries, step by step, while emphasizing the fundamental necessity to 
narrow the duty's application.179 By the time this process ended, the Court 
presented a restricted and entirely modeled duty of care which:180
172. The mother-plaintiff sued mainly for the “shock”, as the Court describes it. Stern, ibid, at 
443. 
173. Stern, ibid.
174. The Court relied here on the case of SC 4/57 Nadir v. Kahanovitz P.D. 11 1464 (1957) 
(Hebrew). However, in the Nadir case, the Justices  rejected the legal rule as unfair and eventually 
stated that the mental suffering incurred  was in addition  to the bodily harm  and therefore, 
compensable. 
175. Stern, supra note 171, at 443. In a later ruling, Israeli courts recognized suits by such 
plaintiffs, provided that they were present at the scene of the accident. See, e.g., DC 582/72 Shakuey 
v. Salman P.M. 1979(ii) 79 (1979) (a mother who lost her son from a car accident and suffered 10% 
permanent psychiatric disability). This requirement also invalidated a man’s claim whose  wife and 
son were killed in a car accident, in DC 53/66 Caradi v. Platzgein P.M. 51 161 (1967). The plaintiff 
argued that due to his overwhelming sorrow, he neglected to feed his horses. The horses eventually 
died out of hunger and as a result, plaintiff’s source of income ceased. 
176. See the survey at SC 5803/95 Zion v. Zach P.D. 51(ii) 267, 274 (1997) (Hebrew). 
177. SC 452,444/87 Al-Socha v. The Estate of the late David Dahan P.D. 44(iii) 397 (1990) 
(Hebrew). 
178. Al-Socha, ibid, at 431. 
179. Al-Socha, ibid, at 432. 
180. See the analysis of the case also at Ariel Porat, Tort law: The Negligence Injustice 
according to the Supreme Court's adjudication from a Theoretical Perspective in YEARBOOK OF THE 
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1) Applied to plaintiffs who have substantial family ties to the directly 
injured victim;181 2) Relates to any exposure to the suffering of the 
victim, regardless of being instrumental or direct;182 3) Closeness in place 
or time to the scene of the event is not required. It is sufficient to show 
that the harm was caused as a result of the other person's suffering; 4) A 
substantial emotional harm to the plaintiff is required. This ruling placed 
Israeli law at a relatively positive starting point. Its duty seemed even 
broader than that prevailing at the time in Anglo-American law.183
Nonetheless, it soon became very clear that its legacy was fundamentally 
different.  
Following Al-Socha, courts in Israel consistently acted in every possible 
manner to narrow the scope of the duty of care that this case had set for 
protection against indirect-emotional harm. At the center of this process 
stood the conceptual transformation of the parameters suggested as 
factors to guide courts’ discretion into rigid preliminary conditions for 
determining the sustainability of the case.184 First, the requirement of 
severity of the loss was construed in the Hativ case185 as a demand to 
prove highly severe and permanent psychiatric disability.186 This 
stringent interpretation, whereby judges are obsessed with psychiatric 
disability percentages rather than with proven emotional harm,187 is 
unprecedented in Anglo-American case law. There, susceptibility to 
medical diagnosis is the only limit set forth by the court for the harm’s 
severity.188 Other commonwealth systems also do not refer to these 
ISRAELI LAW 1991 221, 267-268 (ARIEL ROZEN-TZVI, ED., 1992) (Hebrew), and also by Justice 
Shamgar himself at SC 642/89 The Estate of the late Meir Shneider v. Haifa Municipality P.D. 46(i) 
470, 474-476 (1992) (Hebrew). 
181. This demand was less harsh than the one ruling in England at that time, which allowed 
compensation among first tier family relations alone. However, Justice Shamgar stressed that only in 
extreme and rare cases should second tier plaintiff be considered as compensation entitled. Al-socha,
supra note 177 at 432. 
182. Al-Socha, ibid, at 432-433. 
183. This is how the case was perceived by legal agents. See, e.g., Shneider, supra note 180, at 
475. 
184. MULLANY & HANDFORD, supra note 93, at 44-45. 
185. SC 3798/95 Hasne LTD v. Hatib P.D. 49 (v) 651 (1995) (Hebrew). 
186. A comprehensive survey I conducted on the matter reveals that on average, only plaintiffs 
with a permanent disability of 20% and higher will be considered for compensation. BITTON, supra
note 14, at 110-111. 
187. Markesinis considers the plaintiff's reasonable sensitivity a major factor. He also 
emphasizes and sees as sufficient, the close relationship between the plaintiff and the direct victim. 
MARKESINIS & DEAKIN, supra note 52, at 133. 
188. See, e.g., Marzolf v. Stone, 960 P.2d 424 (Wash.1998). On the other hand, see the 
dissenting opinion in Shell v. Mary Lanning Memorial Hospital Ass’n., 498 N.W.2d 522 (Neb.1993), 
stating: “I hope our society has not reached the point where we need a doctor to tell us what 
emotional impact results from loss of a child.” In England, the House of Lords was even more 
lenient by granting compensation to a plaintiff that was described as being at risk of suffering from 
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standards of psychiatric permanent disability.189 Second, even the 
rescinded requirement of presence at the scene of the accident has been 
misleadingly interpreted as requiring that even an injured party who was
present at the scene of the accident be compelled to meet the strict 
conditions set out in the Al-Socha case - a requirement which stood in 
sharp discrepancy even with the stringent Alcock ruling.190 Third, the 
requirement that the harm be caused in a process of shock, which was 
completely rejected in the Al-Socha case, was restored through the front 
door as one of the core requirements for imposing liability.191 According 
to this incoherent ruling, the more prolonged the direct victim’s suffering 
means exposure to liability by the tortfeasor was.192
3. THREE SYSTEMS, ONE DEPARTURE
Comparing Anglo-American and Israeli law approaches in assessing 
pure-economic loss and indirect-emotional harm shows diverging trends: 
in Anglo-American law, an approach which dismissed the recognition of 
economic loss while introducing exceptions to the general rule has taken 
root. Conversely, in Israeli law, though entertaining Anglo-American 
rhetoric and using it as a primary legal resource to adjudicate the cases, 
the courts have in fact acknowledged the importance of economic loss. 
They perceived it as a growing part of negligence jurisprudence and were 
willing to move farther away from the traditional restrictive rules set by 
its counterparts.193  Reading through Israeli case law, it is rare to find a 
reference to “economic loss” as such;194 this loss is no longer regarded as 
prolonged grief symptoms in the near future. Revenscroft v. Rederiaktiebolget Transatlantic [1991] 3 
All E.R. 73, 77 HL. 
189. THE LAW OF TORTS IN NEW ZEALAND 46-52 (STEPHEN M.D. TODD ED., 1991). 
190. See Zach, supra note 176. This case was the first to analyze the Al-Socha case, supra note 
177. 
191. SC 7836/95 General Medical Services v. The Estate of the late Tammy Keren P.D. 52 (iii) 
199. The Israeli Supreme Court dismissed a suit brought by two daughters whose mother had died as 
a result of medical malpractice. The decision was based, inter alia, on the determination that the 
harm caused to them, arising from the fact they had been exposed for several years to their mother's 
suffering from misdiagnosed cancer until her eventual death, which did not fall within the 
boundaries of the Al-Socha case, ibid.    
192. This was the case's ratio decidendi. The Court also stated, as obiter dictum, that the girls 
were not sufficiently damaged, since despite their emotional suffering they managed to function 
normally. Al-Socha, ibid, at 205.  
193. Gedron, supra note 37, at 184; Gilead, supra note 69, at 126 (Gilead's conclusion was 
limited, as mentioned, to misstatement and misrepresentation cases). 
194. In SC 915/91 The State of Israel v. Levi P.D. 48(iii) 45 (1994) (Hebrew), Chief Justice 
(retired) Shamgar pointed to economic loss as one of the indicators relaxing proximity between rival 
parties in negligence disputes. However, this was not a conclusive indicator and the case dealt 
primarily with narrowing the liability of public authorities. Moreover, no further  discussion of that 
statement can be identified in the subsequent case law. 
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a parameter for narrowing liability under negligence law.195 Indirect-
emotional harm, on the other hand, received some recognition in Anglo-
American law which was later constricted. Nonetheless, even in its 
narrowed form today, the limits shaping this liability do not resemble the 
severity of its Israeli counterpart which continue to confine the scope of 
protection given against this harm. This difference between Israel and 
Anglo-American law is further magnified by the fact that the latter has 
additional compensation schemes for indirect-emotional harm contingent 
upon the death of a close relative.196 Israeli law, on the other hand, lacks 
any such alternative causes. Furthermore, Anglo-American tort law also 
has set the rules concerning indirect-emotional harm and pure-economic 
loss under a fault liability regime of negligence law for these accidents. 
Conversely, in Israeli law, a non-fault, strict liability rule dominates the 
realm of car accidents, to which almost all the case law referred. Under 
such a no-fault liability regime, it is pointless to entertain policy 
considerations of the kind that fault-based negligence law offers. Such 
considerations are practically irrelevant to a no-fault regime and 
unprecedented in any other car accident adjudication.197
In the next Part, I will delineate the details of the course of departure of 
the Israeli system from the Anglo-American ones, specifically focusing 
on its formation. Exposing this specific manner of departure—through an 
extensive review of current and past case law—will avail us, in the last 
part of the article, to provide a more meaningful and contextual 
comparative explanation for the difference between the systems as 
gender-based.  
PART IV: ECONOMIC LOSS AND INDIRECT-EMOTIONAL HARM 
IN ISRAEL - SIMILAR NARRATIVES, DIFFERENT  
REALITIES 
The aforementioned Anglo-American tort narrative presents pure-
economic loss and indirect-emotional harm as equally exceptional harms, 
suffering from the same difficulty of judicial objection and restricted 
recognition. This similarity narrative resumed a place of honor in the 
195. See Justice Shamgar's reservation himself, ibid, at 70. Also see Gedron, who claims that in 
cases of public authorities' liability specifically, the courts do not relate any unique attention to the 
nature of the loss, but rather to the tortfeasor's identity, Gedron, supra note 37, at 164. 
 196. Usually shaped as a regulatory rule allowing some relatively substantial amount of 
damages for such loss. See, e.g., supra note 260.  
197. Israel Gilead, On the Fit between the Tortuous and the Contractual Aspects of the Car 
Accidents Statute, 23 MISHPATIM 389, 390 (1994) (Hebrew). 
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Israeli tort canons as well.198 However, a closer analysis of the separate 
development lines of these harms indicates otherwise. Israeli tort law 
affords wide and systematic protection to a person’s economic interests, 
particularly when bearing in mind the further protection given to them in 
other legal fields.199 On the other hand, the protection given to indirect-
emotional interests is weak, vague, strict, and suffers from a tendency to 
be constricted. Examining these structures of recognition side by side 
illuminates their differences as adjudicative projects, albeit unintended, 
creating two dimension discrimination within tort law. For these 
purposes, I have chosen to focus on the constituting point of these two 
duties of care by comparing the pioneer and groundbreaking judgments 
of each duty of care in Israeli law: the judgment in the Weinstein case
where liability for pure-economic damage was first recognized,200 and the 
judgment in the Al-Socha case, where, for the first time an ordered 
doctrine imposing liability for indirect-emotional harm was 
established.201 The decisions will be compared through a spectrum of 
various parameters that illustrate the different attitudes they embody. 
1. THE RHETORICAL STRUCTURING OF THE DUTY OF CARE
(a) Economic Loss – The Weinstein Case 
The Weinstein case, issued in the 1950’s, established that an engineer 
giving his professional opinion owed a duty of care towards a builder 
who suffered economic loss as a result of this negligent opinion.202
Positioning Weinstein as the starting point, tracking the historical 
development of pure-economic loss in Israeli tort law represents not only 
analytical-historical accuracy but also substantive historical significance. 
This judgment was delivered in Israel in Anglo-American legal tradition; 
198. The monumental case in which this notion was held is SC 243/83 Gordon v. Jerusalem 
Municipality P.D. 39(i) 113, 139-143 (1985), followed by every case (though only few) discussing 
“economic loss”, as such. This notion was reinforced in Israeli literature. See, e.g., AMOS HERMAN,
INTRODUCING TORT LAW 78 (2006) (Hebrew). In his book, which is the most recent and updated 
comprehensive textbook on Israeli tort law, the author dedicates a whole chapter to what he 
identifies as “unique negligence situations”. There, he relates to economic loss and indirect-
emotional harm as similarly “problematic”. 
199. This conclusion is also shared by Jane Stapleton, supra note 41, at 87. 
200. Weinstein, supra note 159.  
201. Al-Socha, supra note 177.  
202. This case revolved around pure-economic loss, whereby the plaintiff, a builder, suffered 
economic loss due to the refusal of the group who hired his services to pay for his construction work, 
which fell below the common standard. The builder argued that his failure was the result of the 
engineer's negligent plans which he was required to follow by the group who hired him. The builder, 
therefore, sued the engineer for his negligent planning, which caused the damage to the building, in 
which he had no invested property rights. The builder did not have any interactions with the 
planning engineer prior to or during performing the work.  
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no recognition was accorded to pure-economic loss in negligence,203
during a period when the common-law had overwhelming influence over 
tort decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court. This rendered the case a 
breakthrough for the legal independence of the young state's courts at
that time.204 In spite of arguments raised to relax its innovative nature,205
one cannot ignore that the judgment's status positioned the economic 
interest in Israeli tort law as one of supreme values to justify breaking 
fundamental legal boundaries. This was the very first case to recognize 
liability in negligence for economic loss. While one would expect such 
precedent to bear restrained and humble reasoning, it in fact proves to be 
autonomous and provocative. However, while the rhetoric of the court 
still stood relatively in line with the general non-recovery rule, its 
substance recognized pure-economic loss as largely protected under 
negligence law. This rhetoric-substance nexus is revealed by a 
meticulous reading of the judgment.     
After reviewing the English case law, where a clear no-recovery rule 
prevailed,206 the Court determined that the element of foreseeability could 
not exclude a type of loss per se.207 This required that the judges deny the 
contrasting English law and rely on the latter’s minority opinions.208
Reviewing the definition of “loss” in the Israeli Tort Ordinance, the 
Court determined that the language of the “basket provision” was broad 
enough to include pure-economic loss.209 The Court stressed that 
plaintiffs’ right to compensation should be extended to all significant 
losses, however tangible.210 Noting that some “important and practical 
reasons” necessitated careful treatment of cases involving 
203. Gilead, supra note 69, at 89. 
204. Daniel Mor, The Tort Ordinance's Forty Years of Rulings, 39 HAPRACKLIT LR 344, 348-
349 (1990) (Hebrew). 
205. Mor tries to present the case in a more conservative manner, by arguing that it could be 
supported by using broad interpretations of the legal tools of that time. Mor, ibid, at 349. 
206. The no-recovery rule was declared in Candler v. Crane Christmas & Co., [1951] 1All E.R. 
426. 
207. “The type of loss in itself should not determine the limits of the scope of liability”. 
Weinstein, supra note 159, at 1332. The Court relied on the general rule used in determining the 
scope of liability as was stated in Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562. 
208. Weinstein, ibid, at 1332; see the references at 1332-1333. The Court also distinguished the 
case before him from other no-recovery cases as being irrelevant to the issue this case raised. Ibid, at 
1334-1340. 
209. At the time the ruling was rendered, the court was statutorily obliged to use the original 
English version of the Ordinance – which was the byproduct of the colonial English sovereign – 
when interpreting it. Starting at 1980, a legislative reform granted the Court the power to use Israeli 
independent interpretation methods. 
210. Weinstein, supra note 159, at 1334. This seems, however, like a misinterpretation of the 
phrase “substantial damage” which was until then understood as a tangible damage, a traditionally 
basic requirement to gaining tort recognition for one's suffering.  
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misstatements,211 the Court did not engage in enumerating a blacklist of 
policy considerations or declaring this loss to be “problematic,” but 
rather it set restrictions for coping with its unwanted implications.  
Structured in this way, the judgment created a “rhetoric of acceptance” of 
pure-economic loss. Upon admitting the importance of the imposing 
liability for this loss and only in its obiter dictum,212 the Court mentions 
that certain “problems” existed, emphasizing that these problems would 
not interfere with its recognition. At the end of its reasoning, the Court 
briefly reviewed each “problem” and subsequently proposed a suitable 
solution, entailing the imposition of some limitations on the scope of 
liability.213 Positioning these limitations at the margins of the ruling 
“softened” them as allowing “restrained acceptance” of the loss without 
resulting in a non-recovery rule. The Court chose to describe well-known 
policy considerations in this field–such as the fear of a flood-tide of cases 
and the imposition of liability disproportionate to fault–as “economic 
rationales” or “practical rationales,” thereby de-dramatizing their 
importance as merely technical and local problems to be easily solved.214
Using the well-known tort rule of reasonable foreseeability,215 the Court 
displayed the simplicity of solving the “problems” it had listed. It also 
left room for future judicial interpretation and creativity without 
restricting future judgments to stringent rules of any kind.  
To conclude, the Court in Weinstein presented a new duty of care in tort 
law according to which: 
“a professional owes a duty not to be negligent when preparing 
an opinion if he prepares it for the purposes of a certain 
transaction of a defined scope, and he will owe this duty to the 
injured party, if he intends the latter to rely on it, whether or not 
he knows the specific identity of the person to whom the opinion 
will regard…”216
211. Weinstein, ibid, at 1340. 
212. The court's discussion on this subject is confined to four pages, and is located at the 
decision’s last part. Weinstein, ibid.
213. Again, the Supreme Court's supportive attitude is reflected also in quantitative criterion: 
Out of the four pages in which he discussed the nature of the loss, only four sentences were 
dedicated by the Court to presenting the problems, while all the rest of the writing was dedicated to 
solving them.  
214. Weinstein, supra note 159159, at 1341. 
215. The Court has almost exclusively used the criterion of “proximity”, representing the 
reasonable “foresight” of the loss, to set the limits of the duty. Weinstein, ibid, at 1342-1347. 
 216. Weinstein, ibid, at 1344. Added to the definition above was the requirement that the 
professional “in the circumstances… could not have a reasonable ground to assume that his opinion 
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Above all, this formulation of the duty demonstrated the Court's use of 
well-known tort principles and parameters which ensured that liability 
would be imposed whenever circumstances indicated that the tortfeasor 
should have seen the economic loss. Thus, the Court created a duty of 
care that had flexible boundaries, evidencing an inner coherent logic and 
enabling appropriate future development.  Indeed, this ruling has created 
a reasonable and acceptable basis for consistent expansion of the duty, 
leaving behind a heritage of practiced recognition for this loss.217
However, throughout its judgment, the Court has referred to the English 
non-recovery rule regarding economic law. Though refraining on the 
rhetorical level from discharging itself from its legal obligation to 
comply with the non-recovery rule, the Court, in the substance of its 
decision, breached and infringed this rule.     
(b) Indirect-emotional Harm - The Al-Socha Case 
As opposed to this complex yet inclusive narrative, an entirely different 
picture emerges in the Al-Socha case. Here, the Court opened its 
discussion with a survey of the Israeli legal tradition in this area, 
referring to the Stern case218 where the Court held that no compensation 
should be awarded for emotional shock per se. It described the 
recognition of the duty for indirect-emotional harm as limited to cases 
where the injured party witnessed the accident, while generalizing the 
issue regarding “bystanders” despite the involvement of plaintiffs 
witnessing an accident to a loved-one.219 Following these problematic 
comments, the Court went on reviewing the English law’s account of the 
harm. It opened with a clarification that the law’s position on this matter 
had been originating from considerations which were described as 
“central” and as “policy related”:220 the risk of a flood of cases; the risk 
of fraudulent claims and the problem of identifying the causal 
connection; a tradition of recognizing this loss only when accompanied 
by physical injury and the fear of imposing an excessive burden on the 
behavior of tortfeasors. Thus, the Court reinforced the reader’s 
instinctive acceptance of the need to substantially limit the duty to 
protect tort law from the dangers it entails.221 A similar usage was carried 
would be doubled-checked, in an independent examination, prior to it being acted upon.” Ibid, at 
1346. 
217. Gilead, supra note 69. 
218. Stern, supra note 171. 
219. This is the general and inaccurate conclusion of Chief Justice (retired) Shamger (Al-Socha,
supra note 177, at 408). 
220. See, e.g., Al-Socha, ibid, at 416, 419, 421. 
221. See, e.g., ibid, at 410-411 (the Hambrook case), 418 (the McLoughlin case), 418-419 (the 
Jaencsh case). 
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with the review of American law as saturated with difficulties in 
recognizing liability for this loss, thereby justifying the need in 
preserving its boundaries.222 By the time it reached the point of 
appropriating a way to approach this loss today, the Court presented a 
heavy burden of important policy considerations, endless limitations and 
comparative gaze which led him “naturally” to construct a restrained 
duty of care, primarily justified on a “solid” tradition of well-based fears. 
Reaching its precedent-setting decision, the Court has again taken the 
last opportunity to enumerate the list of policy considerations. It referred 
to them as requiring a constriction of the duty of care, the existence of 
which as noted, was yet to be proclaimed by the Court!223 Thus, the Court 
constructed the duty through a narrative of restraint required to prevent 
what is described as no less than a veritable catastrophe:224
“… [The] tortfeasor, who negligently caused a physical injury to 
someone, will be obliged to compensate a large number of 
people, whose feelings and mental stability have been affected in 
any way by the negligent event. This result is unacceptable, of 
course, both with respect to the heavy burden on the tortfeasor in 
particular and on human behavior in general, and with respect to 
the burdening of the legal system, which is being asked to
harness itself to the issue in order to offer the protection of the 
law to the interest of not being emotionally hurt. An exclusive 
application of the foreseeability test would cause a multiplicity 
of claims, including, probably, claims for trivial losses, and 
frivolous and fabricated claims. The legal system, which even 
today has great difficulty in coping with the abundance of cases, 
by reason of various limitations that are imposed on it, would 
face a doubling and even a tripling of the claims in connection 
with every accident; a reasonable legal policy cannot lend a hand 
to this…”. 
The Court's words speak for themselves. They create a sentiment of fear 
of total boundaries-breaking. The apocalyptic description of the threats 
embedded in recognizing the loss seem to require the immediate 
imposition of any restrictions, even though these cataclysmic arguments 
had already been disproved, one by one, in seminal judgments under the 
222. See the review of the American case laws at Al-Socha, supra note 177, at 425. 
223. Al-Socha, ibid, at 432. 
224. Al-Socha, ibid, at 432. 
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common-law.225 In particular, presenting the claimants as persons who 
wish to “harness” the legal system to aid them is troublesome. This 
rhetoric made the legal system inaccessible to these claimants and 
consequently excluded them. The legal system is portrayed as one that is 
passively forced to take part in their caprices and not actively 
“harnessed” in a sympathetic manner for reclaiming these claimants’ 
justified rights.  
At this point, the Court set the limitations dictating the duty, shaping it to 
meet exceptional and unique foundations. It constructed the duty not 
using traditional negligence law reasoning but instead constructed the 
duty openly-- acknowledging the application of arbitrary parameters.226 It 
justified this deviance in an absurd manner, i.e., by concentrating on the 
situation which might arise had these limitations not applied.227 The 
frightening policy considerations therefore, were not countered at any 
stage of the ruling, which in turn presented enduring legitimate reasons 
for limiting liability.228 The starting point for the construction of the duty 
of care was that of a “stepchild” to the general losses and not of a “lost 
child” or “new child” pleasuring her “tort law parents” as the way 
economic loss’s experience has been constructed. This narrative of fear 
of a dangerous duty was the seal of approval given to subsequent courts 
to further strengthen the limitations on the duty of indirect-emotional 
harm, which is indeed what actually occurred.229
As the following analysis demonstrates, the divergent manner with which 
the two damages were treated went far beyond rhetoric and attitudes. 
2. RESHAPING THE SCOPE OF TORT LIABILITY - ANCILLARY 
CONSEQUENCES TO THE HARMS' RECOGNITION  
Comparing these two judgments, the contrasting influences exerted by 
the expansion of the limits of liability in negligence is striking. The 
indirect character of the economic loss is seen as the main reason for 
using it in the Anglo-American tradition. Generally, it is a central device 
225. The Court refers to McLoughlin, supra note 142, where the House of Lords refutes the 
traditional objections raised against recognizing the indirect-emotional suffering. Al-Socha, ibid, at 
421, 425-426. 
226. Al-Socha, ibid, at 423. 
227. Shamgar goes back, again, to the fear of fraudulent suits and of compensating mild 
suffering. Al-Socha, ibid, at 436. 
228. The fear of fraudulent suits and of petty suits is brought as the main justification for 
limiting the duty to only plaintiffs suffering from highly substantial mental diseases such as 
Psychosis and Neurosis. Al-Socha, ibid.
229. The fear of petty and fraudulent suits was endorsed in later writing at Porat, supra note 
180, at 267,270. 
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for limiting liability in negligence, in particular in limiting the liability in 
negligence of public officials.230 In contrast, in Israeli law, as I have 
demonstrated, imposing liability for pure-economic loss has led, in most 
cases, to changing the nature of the standard of care by which negligence 
was based and/or for expanding tort liability into new fields of human 
activity. The Weinstein case symbolized this trend more than any other 
case because not only was it the first case to recognize pure-economic 
loss in negligence but it was also the first case to hold that a person who 
gives an opinion owes a duty to act without negligence, even if his 
opinion does not pose a risk of physical injury to another. In contrast to 
this image of breach of varied tort boundaries,231 a conservative image 
emerges from the case law concerning indirect-emotional harm.232 In 
indirect-emotional cases, negligent physical injury to a primary victim 
was inherently involved, so that the tortfeasor was already under an 
obligation to compensate her. The expansion of the duty of care towards 
indirect-emotionally injured parties entailed a change in the boundaries 
of the consequences of the negligent act alone, and not in the boundaries 
of the behavior itself that led to it.233
This difference between these two harms indicates that the Court's 
greatest difficulty with imposing liability for indirect-emotional harm 
originated from its being devalued in its own right. By contrast, much 
reluctance attributed to pure-economic loss derived from viewing it as a 
device for expanding boundaries for negligence liability rather than 
seeing it as problematic or inappropriate per se. Supportive of this 
hypothesis in English law are the expressed words of Lord Oliver in the 
Aliakmon case, to the effect that the quality and type of damage had 
never been a problem in imposing liability for economic loss, but rather 
the circumstances in which it occurred  interfered with the provision of 
compensation.234 In contrast, the entire discussion concerning indirect-
230. Gilead, supra note 69.  
231. In Trade, supra note 168, for example, the Court had to conclude first that there is a lacuna
on this matter in Israeli law, despite the fact that the Israeli Civil Procedure Act, 1984 allowed 
compensation in the case of harmful seizure proceedings only if the case was ruled in favor of the 
party against whom the seizure was held. In Trade, the injured party had not won the original case, 
and was therefore ineligible for such compensation according to this act. Filing a tort law claim, 
therefore, was his only legal chance for compensation. 
232. This breach excluded relational economic loss, where the wrongdoing is obvious and the 
question refers solely to the scope of his liability. PERRY, supra note 58, at 8. 
233. Levit, supra note 4, at 190. The no recovery rule for indirect-emotional harm is also 
incompatible with the tendency to compensate for a generally foreseeable damage. 
234. Aliakmon, supra note 157, at 379-380. 
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emotional harm mostly revolves the nature of this damage as being 
[in]appropriate for compensation.235
3. SILENCE V. OBSESSIVE CONTEMPLATIONS
The Weinstein case was the first and one of the only cases in which the 
Israeli Court termed the pure-economic loss before it as somewhat 
“problematic.”236 However, the simple solution given by Court to its 
problematic features, immediately thereafter, left a clear heritage of a 
firmly recognized loss. Manifestly, since this case, the Court has almost 
never referred to the unique nature of the damage before it as “economic 
loss,” and has chosen to focus its duty considerations discussion on 
fundamental questions regarding the type of circumstances before it, 
rather than in the type of loss it protected.237 For example, in the 
groundbreaking Trade case, in order to protect the plaintiff against 
economic loss, 238 the Court never used the phrase “economic loss” or 
any equivalent term,239 even though the lengthy and detailed judgment 
engaged in multiple breaches of the boundaries set for negligence. This 
trend of ignoring the identification of the damage as purely economic in 
nature and disregarding the difficulties entailed by that is a recurring 
theme in the case law protecting pure-economic interests.240 An Israeli 
scholar who explored economic loss adjudication opined the obvious as 
to the reasoning for this silence, namely that it is simply the judicial 
assumption that according protection against this loss is understandable 
and justifiable per se.241  The Court's lack of clarification regarding its 
attitude towards this loss has left open the question of its desirability.242
235. Handsley, supra note 4, at 458. 
236. Attentively or not, the court has not used the common terminology of “economic loss”, but 
rather related to the case as concerning “monetary harm”. Weinstein, supra note 159159, at 1331.  
237. Gedron claims that the economic loss, as such, was never discussed directly by the Israeli 
courts. Gedron, supra note 37. However, this conclusion is inaccurate. There are evidences of rare 
usage of this loss as pertinent to liability imposition. See SC 451/66 Kornfeld v. Samueloff P.D. 21(i) 
310 (1967) and DC 1586/63 Brikman v. Atid LTD P.M. 58 76 (1973). Also, since Levi, supra note 
194, where economic loss was identified as creating remoteness between parties, economic loss has 
been noted for only three times by Israeli courts, twice by district courts and only once by the 
Supreme Court.  
238. Trade, supra note 168. 
239. The harm to the plaintiff was described by the court as “loss of earning due to the inability 
to utilize the corporation’s assets.”  Trade, ibid, at 647. 
240. Especially in cases where the court imposed liability on public authorities. Gedron, supra
Gedron, supra note 37, at 179.  
241. Gilead, supra note 69, at 117. Gilead illustrates this trend using cases where liability for a 
defective product was imposed to redress for economic loss. 
242. This is also Gilead’s conclusion. Gilead, ibid, at 126. For that reason, Gilead himself finds 
it difficult to deduct a clear rule regarding economic loss based on the vast judicial overview he 
conducted.  
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Consequently, pure-economic loss that is traditionally and repeatedly 
defined by common-law as problematic, controversial and challenging 
the natural boundaries of negligence law, was not attributed special 
treatment in Israeli law, silently legitimating it much like any other 
recognized form of loss which does not require special deliberation.243 In 
clear contrast stands the heritage left behind by the Al-Socha case: The 
exaggerated and repetitive remarks by the Court concerning the nature of 
the harm as problematic and dangerous led to a legacy of consistently 
repeated obsessive deliberations where the courts consciously and openly 
trouble themselves with the question of the desirability of this type of 
damage and the boundaries for liability it should bear.244 Consequently, 
the likelihood of the injured party to recover in these cases decreases 
each time. Furthermore, a clear message is sent to the other courts: when 
compensation for indirect-emotional harm is plead, great caution should 
be exercised and it is very rarely awarded.   
4. LEGAL TRANSPLANTATION IN ISRAELI TORT LAW – THE
COMMITMENT TO COMMON-LAW RULE
The principle of commitment to common-law through the statutory 
obligation to apply English law dominated Israeli law when the first 
cases concerning indirect-emotional harm and pure-economic loss were 
decided.245 According to this principle, Israeli courts were compelled to 
follow English rulings when adjudicating tort cases. This commitment 
was qualified: the Israeli judge was required to identify the leading 
principle in the English ruling in the area in which he was required to 
make a decision and fully apply it to the case before him unless English 
law would have contradicted Israeli social values.246 An examination of 
the use made by the Israeli courts of this methodological principle 
reveals the attitude displayed by the courts towards these losses. Though 
both losses were subject to restraints under English law in actuality, at 
the time when Israeli courts had made a decision regarding them, each 
was treated differently.   
243. See, e.g., DC 307/93 Menora Insurance Com. v. The Drainage Authority TK-MH 2001 (i) 
1888, 1899 (2001) (Hebrew), where the court stated: “The courts have acknowledged the viability of 
a duty of care not to harm one’s economic interest, even when this economic interest is not derived 
from a harm to one’s physical interest.”   
244. See, e.g., Sneider, supra note 180, at 472-473; Zach, supra note 176, at 273-274; DC 
697/94 Razon v. Haddassah Organization TK-MH 97(iii) 2825 (1996) (Hebrew). 
245. Article 2(1) of The Civil Tort Ordinance of 1944, which was then in effect (1944 The 
Official Newspaper of Palestine, no. 94). Weinstein, supra note 159, at 1328-1334. See the Court’s 
expressed declaration of this obligation in Stern, supra note 171, at 427. 
246. The limits of this judicial obligation are elaborated in Izhak Englard, Aron Barak, Mshael 
Cheshin, Tort Law – The General Principles 55-72 (2nd ed. Gad Tedeschi ed., 1978) (Hebrew). 
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The judgment in Weinstein not only clearly illustrates how it was 
possible to become free from the English ruling in the tort law alone, but 
also symbolized this possibility of freedom and the creation of local 
independent rulings in general.247  The Court in Weinstein did not hesitate 
to challenge the Anglo-American ruling which had been firmly and long-
lastingly established and declared the ruling irrational.248 Though never 
self-declared as rebelling against English law, both the case law and the 
literature that followed have identified Weinstein as a case in which “the 
Court dared” to act against the binding English law rule, serving as a 
center of attraction for future similar breaches of boundaries.249 In the 
Amidar case, for example, the Court sought to impose liability on a 
defendant, not an expert, in the field in which he negligently advised. 
Thus, in its ruling the Court diverged from the limitation embedded in 
English law, according to which liability for negligent misstatement was 
conditional upon being given by an expert in his area of business 
expertise.250 Moreover, the Court explicitly stressed his ability to act in a 
manner contrary to existing English rule, even though ultimately a 
decision on the matter was not required in this specific case.251
Throughout the Court's stages of ‘liberating’ itself from English law in 
the Amidar case, the Court used the Weinstein case as an authoritative 
precedence.252
A converse and conservative trend may be seen in the cases concerning 
indirect-emotional harm. This trend already began in cases preceding Al-
Socha, such as in the Stern case253 which considered a claim for 
compensation for emotional harm caused to a mother as a result of her 
son's death in a cesspit. In dismissing the mother's claim, the Court made 
247. Only recently, the Weinstein case was revisited and declared a tort ruling which required at 
that time a further hearing procedure, due to the expansion of the duty of care in negligence  and the 
disobedience it proved within English law: “It seems like the precedent regarding expanding the 
liability for economic interests (see, e.g., 106/54 Weinstein v. Kadima…), should have been 
subjected to further judicial scrutiny after decided.”  SC 983/02 Jacobob v. The State of Israel P.D., 
56(iv) 385, 395 (2002) (Hebrew). It is extremely rare for the Israeli Supreme Court to hold a second, 
additional deliberation, with an enlarged panel of judges who are called upon to reevaluate their 
fellow-judges' former decision. 
248. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 159, at 1332 (“there is no rational foundation”), 1339 
(“lack of reason”). 
249. Amidar, supra note 159, at 348; DC 1820/90 Ma’ale Efraim printing LTD v. Ellerman 
Lines Plc, P.M. 1995(ii) 17 (1995) (Hebrew). The literature also conceives Weinstein in a similar 
manner. See Englard, Barak & Cheshin, supra note 246, at 52.
250. Amidar, ibid, at 340-341. 
251. In Amidar, ibid, at 348, the Court followed: “most surely, now that the days of Israeli 
obligation to common-law rules are over, it is time for us to seek our way based on what is right and 
just in our eyes.” 
252. Amidar, ibid, at 348. 
253. Stern, supra note 171. 
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full use of English rulings. It declared its commitment to the English 
non-recovery rule, using it as an unimpeachable source. The Court 
refrained from examining the English rule's unconvincing logic, its 
arbitrary distinctions, the heavy criticism it had already attracted at that 
time and its discrepancy with the local Israeli Tort Ordinance.254 This was 
particularly incoherent with the fact that in the beginning of its judgment, 
the Court used the platform to make the unprecedented decision that it 
was not bound to implement English precedents literally, but rather was 
required to bring to the surface the relevant principle of English law in 
the field “and after doing so, would apply this principle to the concrete 
case before it, while paying attention to the special conditions prevailing 
in Israel and conforming to the concepts and views of the members of 
Israeli society.”255
This comment, apt in the particular case, was not implemented in it. The 
Court did not conduct any examination regarding the applicability of its 
ruling to the concepts and views on life in Israeli society. Even though 
there is no guaranty that this sort of examination would have led to a 
different ruling, there is no doubt that its absence prevented a genuine 
discussion of the issue. Hypothetically, it may be that in Israeli society at 
that time, in which concern for others, human socialization and 
community activity were the shaping factors deemed to be invaluable, it 
was certainly possible to demand recognition of this type of damage, in 
which care for another grounded the harm.256 The 1956 Weinstein ruling 
favored the advantages of independent and original Israeli local rulings. 
It undoubtedly could have been used as a sufficient legal basis for a 
similar decision in Stern.  In other words, the 1958 Stern case could have 
brought forward by decades the protection against indirect-emotional 
harm, granted in the 1990 Al-Socha case.257
Though years had passed and times had changed, even in the 1990 Al-
Socha case, where the Israeli judiciary had already attained complete 
independence from English law, this problematic bond remained 
unchallenged. Notwithstanding challenging parts of the Anglo-American 
254. Josef Gross, The Rule of Nervous Shock, 16 HAPRAKLIT LR 145, 152 (1959) (Hebrew). 
Gross stresses that at that stage, the de facto separation of Israeli law from English law could have 
lead the Court to an opposite direction. It could have allowed a more tolerant attitude toward nervous 
shock. 
255. Stern, supra note 171. 
256. Similarly, in a later case, the court expressed open criticism of the English ruling that 
refused to recognize emotional harm, however, the court still regarded itself as bound by the ruling.
Nadir, supra note 174, at 1468-1470. 
257. Gross has severely criticized the court’s adherence to the English rule regarding nervous 
shock which was already infamous at that time. Gross, supra note 254, at 277. 
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ruling,258 the courts in fact created a system of principles which were 
guided by this ruling. Indeed, it gave rise to a duty that developed with 
time into one which was even more stringent than its Anglo-American 
counterpart. This outcome was particularly problematic since while 
reviewing the limited recognition given to indirect-emotional harm in 
English law, the Court ignored a critical factual element whereby this 
limited recognition was accompanied by a statutory duty to compensate 
typical indirect-emotional injured family members.259 This legislation 
always ensured some degree of compensation for this type of harm, even 
if not substantive.260 The absence of such comparable provision in Israeli 
law fundamentally changes the practical meaning of a rule of non-
recovery shaped within it. 
5. WEINSTEIN V. AL-SOCHA - SUMMARY
The ruling in Weinstein was constructed along the lines of traditional tort 
principles while easily overcoming familiar tort obstacles. The general 
duty of care established with respect to pure-economic loss thus allowed 
the creation of a heritage of developing a recognition alongside a 
constant removal of restrictions, amounting to an eventual establishment 
as an independent, logical and autonomous duty of care.261 In contrast, 
the ruling Al-Socha was based on problematic tort rules and relied on 
restrictive principles and a controversial Anglo-American tradition. It 
created a rigid heritage for later judgments which obsessively preserved 
these boundaries and even narrowed them. The distorted formulation of 
the duty of care simply discharged lower courts from exercising their 
own discretion in other case based on their merits their unique 
circumstances. Moreover, a comparison of these two central judgments 
shows that not only was the duty of care as a core concept in tort law 
understood differently in each case, but the type of damage in each case 
was also perceived differently. In contrast to the Court’s warm approach 
in Weinstein to the type of damage before it, the Court in Al-Socha did 
258. Al-Socha, supra note 177, at 423-433.  
259. Sec. 1A to the Fatal Accidents Act, 1976 (1976 c 30): “1A. Bereavement (1) An action 
under this act may consist of or include a claim for damages for bereavement. (2) A claim for 
damages for bereavement shall only be for the benefit: (a) of the wife or husband...” UK Parliament 
Act, 22nd July 1976. 
260. In the 1991 amendment to this act, the compensation sum has been raised  to 7,500 pounds. 
Similar eligibility for expanded circle of plaintiffs is statutorily available in Scotland, where the sum 
is not capped. See PETER CANE, ATIYAH’S ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 74 (6th ed. 
1999). 
261. Weinstein has less than 20 references in successive Israeli cases, whereas Al-Socha holds 
an impressive score of over 60 citations in almost every case regarding indirect-emotional suffering. 
This statistic is particularly startling given the fact that the former case is 38 years older than the 
latter. 
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not consider, even once, the importance of recognizing the emotional 
interest of caring for others, and did not acknowledge its rightful place in 
the array of appropriate harms. Thus, indirect-emotional harm was 
understood to be inappropriate per se.
Despite their differences, neither men nor women are mentioned as 
bearing relevance on the duties set in Al-Socha and Weinstein. In this 
respect, these rulings are classic demonstrations of what is best known as 
“second generation discrimination” practice whereby subtle, 
unintentional and hard-to-track-back practices are exercised as 
exclusionary means. Israeli courts did not need to use any blatant or 
explicit gender-related reasoning to wind-up having with a highly 
gendered course of ruling.262 Finding clear female anti-sentiments or 
male pro-sentiments in the courts’ decisions regarding indirect-emotional 
harm or pure-economic loss is impossible, as well as not required to 
constitute its gendered nature. Probing into the different paths of 
recognition borne by the two losses satisfies the realization of their 
distinctive status and relative importance. The regressive distributive 
effects these paths entail, to be hereby presented, also contribute to 
understanding their gendered significance, regardless of the judiciary’s 
actual consciousness or intentionality. 
PART V: DISTRIBUTIVE RAMIFICATIONS OF A TRIPLED BIAS  
Even though all three legal systems show a gender bias against indirect-
emotional harm, they still differ substantially. While Anglo-American 
negligence law presents a one-dimension bias against female-related 
interests, Israeli tort law takes the gap between gender-related interests to 
the extreme by setting gender-related interests at a zero-sum game 
structure where what men gain in negligence liability rules, women lose. 
Alternatively stated: while men gain, women lose.263 Israeli law 
demonstrates triple-dimensional bias, whereby tort law strongly 
discriminates against female-related interests (first), synchronically, it 
strongly favors male-related interests (second), and eventually this 
discrimination is administered under a rhetorical smoke screen, claiming 
that these interests are equally marginal to negligence liability, thereby 
making this favoritism less apparent to the naked eye (third). Hence, it 
262. The distinction between first and second generation discrimination and its vast implications 
is introduced in  Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural 
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001). 
263. See Rose, supra note 34 (laying out the different possibilities of the positioning of 
gendered interests).  
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ends up much more culpable than the former legal systems with respect 
to feminist accusations of being gender-structured.  
As indicated by the first tier of tort law feminist analysis, Anglo-
American negligence law’s one-dimension bias has clear distributive 
implications. It perceives emotional stability as having limited 
importance264 and implies that those who suffer emotional harm will also 
suffer from the lack of trust of the court in their damage. Additionally, 
these people will probably suffer from demands for high levels of proof 
and a history of hostile precedents to a perception that somehow they 
possess some personality defect which distinguishes them from the 
reasonable person265 and punishes them through non-compensation.266
Women, as the ones to whom maintaining an emotional relationship of 
caring is assigned, mainly inside the family, are disproportionately 
burdened by the restricted recognition of indirect-emotional harm. They 
are, therefore, particularly vulnerable to this recognition’s regressive 
effects.267 The Israeli system’s three-dimension discrimination scheme 
adds more crucial distributive implications to this existing unfairness. I 
shall hereby turn to these implications.  
1. DOUBLE DISCRIMINATION: PREFERRING MALE-RELATED 
INTERESTS WHILE DISCRIMINATING AGAINST FEMALE-RELATED 
INTERESTS
As those for whom emotional harm is particularly relevant and for whom 
their emotional interest is a substantial “asset,” women find themselves
injured twice. Consequently, they are discriminated against twice by 
virtue of the restrained attitude taken by tort law towards emotions.268
The first injury occurs when a woman is required to meet the strict 
requirements of tort law in order to prove the grounds of her claim for 
indirect-emotional harm. Even if she succeeds in this task, she will 
absorb the second injury when her compensation is set relatively low by 
264. Levit, supra note 4, at 172. 
265. Fleming also proposes to compensate people with high emotional sensitivity, since this is a 
human trait that should not be held against them. FLEMING, supra note 64, at 180-181.  
266. Levit, supra note 4, at 175-176. 
267. This claim is the common thread shared by feminist writing on this topic. Particularly, it is 
stressed generally by Chamallas, supra note 0, at 465-466 ; Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 2, at 
814-815; Handsley, supra note 0,, at 458-485. See also Levit, supra note 0, at 190.  
268. Statistically it has been established that women are compensated twice as much as men 
when it comes to evaluating a plaintiff’s “pain and suffering.” Accordingly, women are more likely 
to be affected by any institutionalized reduction of this type of damage. Thomas Koenig, Michael 
Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice in Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1, 81-84 (1995). 
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virtue of the lower evaluation of the violated interest.269 In Israeli law, 
specifically, the victim is further discriminated against when pure-
economic loss, which is a form of damage mainly suffered by men, 
attracts greater protection and relatively fewer limitations. Even though 
these tort law entitlements do not have an intrinsic structure of a zero-
sum game, women are still being discriminated against by this 
proposition since culturally and traditionally women do not receive 
economic appreciation for their work in the labor market. Therefore, they 
have limited access to protected economic interests and to the benefits 
arising from them. Therefore, as a whole, they benefit much less from 
tort law than men do.       
2. PREFERRING THE WEALTHY TO THE IMPOVERISHED
One of the most important of contemporary critiques of law, feminist 
analysis here proves to be valuable not only to women, but rather to 
further weakened communities. According preference to pure-economic 
loss over indirect-emotional harm has a socio-economic significance 
beyond the gender lines. It embodies the capitalistic approach in which 
the law is a tool for strengthening the status of the wealthy by 
overprotecting industrial capital and insufficiently protecting human 
capital and its derivatives. Richard Abel, a Marxist analyst of the law, 
raised this argument regarding the massive protection accorded by tort 
law against damage to property. In his opinion, this protection stems 
from a clear political decision to strengthen the wealthy and preserve the 
notion of capitalism in the rhetorical guise of legal decisions made by 
virtue of binding legal rules. This leads to the establishment of 
incoherent and arbitrary compensatory rules270 such as the restrictions 
imposed on compensation for indirect-emotional injury. Abel focuses on 
the distributive outcome of this preference which perpetuates social gaps 
and prefers those who own property. In his opinion, only an ex-ante 
equal allocation of property resources in society could have justified this 
ex-post protection.271
An analysis of the findings in this article enables us to entertain an 
important paraphrase of Abel's idea. The protection of pure-economic 
loss is in fact the protection of a manifest capitalist interest – money. 
Often, it also protects colonialist entities, as companies having money as 
269. Lisa M. Ruda, Caps on Noneconomic Damages and the Female Plaintiff: Heeding the 
Warning Signs, 44 Case Wes. RES. L. REV. 197, 219-226 (1993). 
270. Richard L. Abel, Should Tort Law Protect Property Against Accidental Loss, 23 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 79 (1986) 
271. Abel, Ibid, at 106-110, 117-119. 
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their sole interest.272 Tort protection of money strengthens property 
owners and not human capital in its most basic sense – mental sanity. 
Apart from being capitalistic by nature, this protection also fails to treat 
the entire population equally; this is due to the fact that not everyone 
enjoys the privilege of owning money. In contrast, the emotional 
interests embedded in connectedness should be considered a general 
human asset; therefore, protecting them against harm affords equal 
protection to all. Moreover, even if we accept the theory that the 
common-law has “gone bad” by returning to the policy of avoiding the 
imposition of liability for pure-economic loss, the origin of this theory 
still seems to be generated by “masculine-economical” concerns whereby 
courts have understood that imposing liability for economic loss entails 
excessive interference in the “free” economic relations between 
individuals as works against the notion of “free competition”.273 Courts 
have also appreciated the central role played by the tort of negligence 
and its strong influence on commercial life and on the economic relations 
between ordinary citizens and professionals.274 Thus, the profits from this 
development remain in the possession of those primarily concerned with 
the management methods of the economic world.
Richard Abel proposes a solution to the unequal protection of interests. 
Namely, that tort law should no longer function as a compensatory 
mechanism for property damage but rather it should be confined solely to 
the protection of the body. Protection to property will be given to those 
who enjoy the privilege of owning property (or money) by choosing to 
insure themselves against the risks arising from this ownership. Thus not 
imposing the burden of compensation upon society as a whole. Within 
such newly structured policies, it would be difficult to remain convinced 
by arguments concerning flood-tides and the restrictions on the tort 
compensation system. These arguments would become less relevant 
upon the system being initially limited to only the most important type of 
harm, which threatens rich and poor alike--bodily harm.275
272. HOWARTH, supra note 54, at 326 (presenting this argument and its countering argument). 
273. Bryan v. Maloney, (1995) 69 ALJR 375, 385 (Canadian Supreme Court Judge Brennan’s 
opinion). 
274. Stapleton, supra note 45, at 296. 
275. Able grounds his objection to compensating emotional harm mainly at the “co-modifying” 
effect this might have on human feelings. In conjunction with this objection, we can also add the 
suggestion made by the feminist tort scholar, Leslie Bender, namely, that this kind of harm should be 
granted as a remedy which is more appropriate than a compensation writ, which is merely financial; 
e.g., compelling the tortfeasor to perpetuate the memory of the deceased  victim. Leslie Bender, 
Feminist (Re) Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power and Responsibilities 1990 
DUKE L. JOUR. 848, 895-908 (1990). 
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Abel's idea may seem too revolutionary at first glance. However, a closer 
look reveals that his ideas share a common ground with one of the court-
backed rationales for denying recovery for pure-economic loss. Namely, 
that the indirect victim was under a duty to regulate in advance the risk to 
his money–which eventually materialized–by way of insurance or by 
using contractual tools.276 This reasoning is not far removed from Abel's 
abovementioned idea.  
I do wish, though, to raise my concerns as to the usefulness of Abel's 
incisive proposal of according no protection in tort law to pure-economic 
loss altogether. Such a sweeping conclusion may also place at risk the 
group of people whom Abel’s initial intention was to protect: lower class 
population, which might also benefit from the protection given by tort 
law to pure-economic interests in the case that one of its members is
financially affected by a bad deal. Moreover, this protection may actually 
be much more useful for a lower class victim than it is to an upper-class 
victim since the former is under a greater risk of entering into a bad deal, 
precisely because of her inherent contractually inferior position.277
Another concern is that the money earned by lower class individuals is 
immeasurably more valuable to them under the diminishing marginal 
value of the money principle. 
3. THIRD DISCRIMINATORY DIMENSION: LIMITING SUSCEPTIBILITY 
TO CRITIQUE 
According to the liberal myth, only discrimination which is motivated by 
unacceptable distinctions between men and women is prohibited. 
Disparate treatment, as opposed to disparate impact which is of a 
consequential nature, is considered the main discrimination method 
worthy of research and exploration.278 This article’s analysis of protected 
interests in negligence law reveals the importance of seeking 
consequential discrimination whereby courts do not attribute–at least not 
openly–a gender-based dimension to their decisions.279 This article’s 
probing into Israeli law discloses a further discriminatory dimension, the 
rhetoric one, which makes gender preference much more difficult to 
276. FELDTHUSEN, supra note 105105, at 204-209. The author points to self-insurance as the 
main mechanism through which economic losses should be handled.  
277. Peter Siegelman, Race Discrimination in “Everyday” Commercial Transactions: What Do 
We Know, What Do We Need To Know, and How Can We Find Out, in A National Report Card on 
Discrimination in AMERICA: THE ROLE OF TESTING 69 (MICHAEL FIX & MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER 
EDS., 1999). 
278. Chamallas, supra note 3, at 466-467. 
279. In the cases where the gender was specified, it was in a concrete manner, such as in Dillon,
supra note 53, where the court indicated that the plaintiff was “a mother”. 
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uncover and criticize. Pure-economic loss and indirect-emotional harm 
are presented in the tort rhetoric as “step-children” of tort law, both 
suffering from a similar attitude of rejection, while actually receiving 
different treatment. This treatment leaves indirect-emotional harm on the 
sidelines of tort law and most types of economic loss remain as the 
central focal point. This reality makes courts’ insistence on similarity 
between the damages and maintenance of this myth even more 
problematic. It is thus imperative to reveal the false reality behind this 
rhetorical smoke screen as a means to illuminate it to the judges and to 
their learned audiences. Discriminating is one thing, but discriminating 
while advancing a message of equality is another. Criticism is more 
likely to be openly and easily established in the former case in a manner 
that will open the floor for sincere discussions of the possibility to adopt 
fair and impartial alternatives. 
PART VI: READING BETWEEN THE LINES AND BETWEEN 
LEGAL SYSTEMS 
Armed with a comparative analysis and its implications, I shall turn 
briefly to reflect on the phenomenon whereby the Israeli legal system 
draws heavily on dominant Anglo-American law. While it preserves its 
rhetoric as a relatively binding legal transplantation, it nonetheless 
administers exceptionally different legal and ideological standards. The 
reasons for the differences between Israeli law and its sources of 
knowledge and inspiration are probably varied, reflecting different lines 
of association and significant demarcations between these legal systems. 
However, my main interest lies in illuminating, through this research, a 
specific gendered characteristic of Israel with regards to women’s rights 
which is reflected in its treatment of gender-related interests in 
negligence law.  
The comparative analysis undertaken by the article was intended to serve 
as a tool to evaluate the feminist contention that common-law tort law is 
androcentric. My hypothesis was that gender-related interests in one 
system, albeit latent or vital within specific doctrines, would adapt the 
patterns of gender-bias characteristics of another legal system, once 
transplanted. Thus, I suggest that the apparent differences between the 
three legal systems are not to be read as a signifier of discontinuity 
between them, but rather as an extremist application by Israeli courts 
based upon Anglo-American gender-based tendencies. Though absorbed 
through seemingly neutral doctrines, these tendencies were practiced and 
developed in Israel, adapting to its unique gender bias settings. Israel is 
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generally more gender-stratified compared to England and the United 
States.280 Yet, it holds, synchronically, a seemingly equal legal rhetoric 
regarding women’s rights. Israel, therefore, can be characterized as 
having an astonishing resemblance to what has been portrayed 
throughout this article. It has the pretence of a high commitment to 
gender equality, while its details fail to follow its commitment.281 This 
specific gender bias structure can be easily traced not only within Israel’s 
negligence law protection of pure-economic loss and indirect-emotional 
loss, but also within Israel’s general antidiscrimination laws.  
Established as a young state with socialist aspirations advocated by its 
dominant founders, Israel has promised equality to its female members 
from the beginning.282 As opposed to its English and American 
counterparts, who initially exercised blatantly unequal treatment of their 
female communities by both de jure and de facto mechanisms,283 Israel 
held an arguably equal starting point. Israel has professed its gender 
equality ideology through some of its constitutive legal institutions: First, 
within its Proclamation of Independence stating that: “The state of 
Israel…will ensure complete equality…irrespective of…sex,”284 followed 
by the Women's Equality Act of 1951, providing that “A man and a 
woman shall have equal status with regard to any legal action.”285
Another means by which Israel has presented its formal commitment to a 
socialist stance of equal share in establishing the young state was its 
 280. My rough assertion is based on the comprehensive findings of the Human Development 
Report (HDR), which provides an analytical tool developed by the United Nations Development 
Program. The report has two composite indexes-the Gender-Related Development Index (GDI) and 
the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM).The purpose of the indexes is to rank countries on a 
global scale by their performance with respect to gender equality issues. The latest report, compiled 
in 2000, indicates that on both the GDI and the GEM ranking, Israel is ranked 23rd, whereas the 
United States is ranked 3rd and the United Kingdom is ranked 10th (pages 161, 165 to the report). 
The HDR can be found in full version at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2000_EN.pdf.  
281. For a comprehensive review of the gender stratification in Israel, see generally, RUTH 
HALPERIN-KADDARI, WOMEN IN ISRAEL; A STATE OF THEIR OWN (2004).  
 282. Obviously, this promise was made mainly towards Israel’s Jewish women community. See
Pnina Lahav, Assessing the Field: New Departures in Israel Legal History, Part Three: “A Jewish 
State . . . to Be Known as the State of Israel”: Notes on Israeli Legal Historiography 19 LAW &
HIST. REV.387, 407-412 (2001). Lahav describes the historic circumstances which define the 
“audience” and “referees” of the call for gender equality of the Declaration as exclusively Jewish.  
283. For England, see generally, E. LING-MALLISON, LAW RELATING TO WOMEN (1930). For 
America, sources are practically endless. See, e.g., ASHLYN K. KUERSTEN, WOMAN AND THE LAW 
(2003); JUDITH A BAER, WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAW: THE STRUGGLE TOWARD EQUALITY FROM THE 
NEW DEAL TO THE PRESENT (3rd ed. 2002). For a survey of the Anglo-American systems, see 
generally, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND THEORY (BARBARA A.
BABCOCK ET AL. EDS.1996).
 284. Proclamation of Independence (second part), (1948) L.S.I. (Laws of the State of Israel) 3. 
 285. Other rules provided, very early after the establishment of Israel, protection against 
discrimination in the labor market. See Employment Service Law, 1959, 13 L.S.I. 29, where 
employers are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of sex. 
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obligatory draft to the army.286 In Israel, where the army was in fact the 
leading force in “building the nation,” this equal rule carried with it great 
symbolic as well as financial promise to Jewish women.287
These institutionalized guaranties of equality makes Israel’s unequal 
realities, revealed through Israeli law, even more painful: women were 
and still are subjected by law to one of the main causes of “homegrown” 
Israeli women-only suffering.288 This suffering results from the 
domination of religious rules and religious courts over the realm of 
marriage and divorce rights whereby women are particularly 
discriminated.289 The promise embedded in joint military service for 
equality (albeit non-feminist in many respects) was soon shattered. It was 
initially shattered by the practice of complete prohibition in assigning 
women to combat positions, and later, after the ban was removed by the 
Supreme Court,290 through non-formal gendered division of labor and 
representations.291 Since these first steps of statehood legislation, Israel 
has further produced an impressive abundance of black-letter rules 
protecting women’s rights and needs, especially in the labor market.292
Nonetheless, the inferior status of women in this particular sphere has not 
changed significantly.293 Furthermore, many of its labor law regulations 
are actively shaped through the notions that women are the national 
 286. It is important  at this point to stress the mythical component of this Israeli tale. For a 
detailed discussion of the limits of the so-called equal draft duty see Noya Rimalt, Equality with a 
Vengeance: Female Conscientious Objectors in Pursuit of a Voice and Substantive Gender Equality,
16 COLUM. J. GENDER & LAW 97, 102-121 (2007). 
 287. See Nitza Berkowitz, ‘Women of Valor’: Women and Citizenship in Israel 2 ISRAELI 
SOCIOLOGY 277 (1999).  
 288. ‘Homegrown” indicates that this suffering is unique to Israel, where is has grown. See
more broadly, HALPERIN-KADDARI, supra note 281, at 263-286 and Yifat Bitton, Public Hierarchy – 
Private Harm: Negotiating Divorce within Judaism, in (RE)INTERPRETATIONS: THE SHAPES OF 
JUSTICE IN WOMEN'S EXPERIENCE 61 (LAUREL S. PETERSON AND LISA DRESDNER EDS., 2008). 
 289. Section 1 to the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 1953 (Laws 
of the State of Israel [LSI] 139) states that: “[m]atters of marriage and divorce of Jews in Israel, 
being nationals or residents of the state, shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of rabbinical court.” 
This grants exclusive jurisdiction over these matters to the male-only religious judges who sit on the 
state rabbinical courts (dayanim) and subjects the couple-litigants to the religious Jewish (halakhic) 
rulings. Similar ordinances subjects Muslim, Druse and Christian Israeli citizens to their relevant 
religious tribunals. This discriminatory rule applies thus to almost all Israeli women, not just Jewish 
ones.  
 290. HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Defense 49 P.D.(iv) 94 (1995). 
 291. See Orna Sasson-Levi, Subversiveness Within Oppression: Gender Identities for Women 
Soldiers in ‘Male’ Roles, in WILL YOU LISTEN TO MY VOICE? REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN IN 
ISRAELI CULTURE 277 (Yael Atzmon, ed., 2001) (a study focusing on the attitudes of women 
soldiers who served in combat duties, which found that they tended to isolate themselves from other 
women, whom they perceived as weak and spoiled).
292. For an updated review of labor law’s commitment to gender equality see Leora F. 
Eisenstadt, Privileged but Equal? A Comparison of U.S. and Israeli Notions of Sex Equality in 
Employment Law, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 357, 365-367 (2007). 
 293. See, generally, the comprehensive research at VERED KRAUS, SECONDARY 
BREADWINNERS: ISRAELI WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE (2002).  
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assets of the Jewish state rather than workers requiring protection of 
varied interests.294
Judicial activism for women’s rights has proven to be moderately 
successful,295 notwithstanding some landmark decisions made in their 
favor.296 Some Israeli feminists have even gone as far as denouncing 
some of the Supreme Court’s most significant landmark decisions in 
favor of women as embracing the Israeli social narrative of women’s 
subordination.297 Others claim that the advancement of women’s rights 
was a result of Israel’s overall socio-economic advancement and not 
based on the special care for their rights or concerns about their uniquely 
inferior position.298 For this reason, when measuring a woman’s status in 
society, Israel scores much higher than it does with regard to more 
substantial and complex parameters.299 This gap can also be associated 
with the gap between the basic pretense of Israel’s black letter laws 
which are more substantial and embody a more complex application of 
various legal doctrines. Another pattern of this rhetorical and practical 
dichotomous gap has been revealed by Israeli feminist scholar Frances 
Raday. In a profiling survey she evaluated the judicial activism 
tendencies of Israel’s Supreme Court justices concerning the right to 
equality. Raday concludes that regardless of the progressive force of 
most of the justices’ rhetoric, which advocated socio-dynamic expanding 
294. See Nitza Berkovitch, Motherhood as a National Mission: The Construction of 
Womanhood in the Legal Discourse in Israel, 20 WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL FORUM 605 (1997). 
295. See, generally, WOMEN’S STATUS IN LAW AND SOCIETY (FRANCES RADAY, CARMEL 
SHALEV & MICHAL LIBAN-KOBI, EDS. 1995) (Hebrew); Frances Raday, Feminist Legal Theory, 
Legislation and Litigation in Israel – a Retrospective in STUDIES IN LAW, GENDER AND FEMINISM,
(DAPHNA BARAK-EREZ AT EL EDS. 2008) (Hebrew).  
296. See, e.g., HCJ 153/87 Shakdiel v. Minister of Religious Affairs P.D. 42(II) 221 (1988) 
(appointing women to municipal religious committees), HCJ 953/87 Poraz v. Mayor of Tel-Aviv
P.D. 42(II) 309 (1988) (allowing women to vote for municipal Rabbis), Miller, supra note 290 
(enforcing equal drafting to the air force pilots training course), HCJ 2671/98 Women’s lobby v. 
Minister of Labor P.D. 53(III) 630 (1998) (instatement of a public duty to equal representation for 
women in governmental entities), HCJ 3358/95 Hoffman v. Israel Prime Minister P.D. 54(II) 345 
(2000) (allowing women to publically pray at a religious site, traditionally reserved for men alone). 
 297. See Daphne Barark-Erez, The Feminist Battle for Citizenship: Between Combat Duties and 
Conscientious Objection, 13 CARDOZO JOUR. OF LAW & GENDER 531 (2007). See also the 
Palestinian stance in that respect, at Hassan Jabarin, Toward Critical Approaches of the Palestinian 
Minority: Citizenship, Nationality, and Feminism in Israeli Law, in ARMY, SOCIETY AND LAW 217 
(Daphne Barak-Erez ed., 2002). For a less critical view of women’s rights in Israel as a success story 
see Yoav Dotan, The Spillover Effect of Bills of Rights: A Comparative Assessment of the Impact of 
Bills of Rights in Canada and Israel, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 293 (2005). 
298. HALPERIN-KADDARI, supra note 281, at 12. 
299. HALPERIN-KADDARI, ibid, at 11-12. 
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perceptions of the concept of equality, a closer analysis reveals that these 
progressive moves lacked operative activism.300
The case of the differential protection of gender-related interests in 
negligence law can therefore be read as exemplary of this systematic trait 
of Israel’s legal practice, whereby the formal black letter and rhetorical 
levels significantly differ from the detailed, practical levels of law 
making.301 The tort devil, for Israeli women, can be found in the details—
not in the recognition of the duty but in its application—in Israel’s 
peculiar conflation of law articulation and judicial rhetoric with law 
application. Drawing from medical language, one can conclude that the 
legal transplantation of negligence law’s protection of gendered interests 
has proved extremely successful: the implant has completely adapted to 
Israel’s original body and works in perfect harmony with its defining 
characteristics.    
This structural finding may invoke an even more far-fetched conclusion. 
The relative gender-based stratification of each of the countries in my 
analysis can be tracked using the United Nations’ GDI (Gender 
Development Index) and GEM (Gender Empowerment Measure) rating 
system which is an international index aimed at ranking countries on a 
global scale by their performance with respect to gender equality issues. 
According to these ratings systems, America is ranked third and the 
United Kingdom is ranked tenth. Israel is ranked twenty-third (out of 174 
countries) regarding the protection of women’s rights. Interestingly 
enough, these rankings seem to fit the findings in this article. America 
led the relatively less restrictive approach to indirect-emotional harm 
with the Dillon case, followed by English law and its more restrictive 
manner of recognition, mainly reflected by the Alcock case. Both these 
nations are nonetheless positioned behind Israel which performs as 
300. Frances Raday, Social Science in the Law: The Israeli Supreme Court: Social Science 
Insights: On Equality -- Judicial Profiles, 35 ISR. L. REV. 380, 450-451 (2001). 
301. Indeed, recently, the Supreme Court of Israel has finally begun its move towards a better, 
more reasonable and more just appreciation of the indirect-emotional harm. In the case of Levi v. 
Sa'arei Tzedek Medical Center, SC 754/05 Levi v. Sa'arei Tzedek Medical Center (not published) 
(2007),the Court declared the rules regarding indirect-emotional harm to be insufficient and 
arbitrary. Interestingly enough, this case signifies a broader trend, where the indirect-emotional harm 
in Israeli case law has turned into the main conceptual tool in developing tort protection of yet 
another feminine life-experience, that of prenatal and natal damages. In these cases, where the 
indirectness of the harm to the mother is contrasted with the direct harm to the baby/fetus, the 
question of whether to impose liability for indirect-emotional harm is frequently raised. See, e.g., SC 
2299/03 The State of Israel v. Terlowski (not published) (2007). Relaxing the limitations on this 
harm in these cases only strengthens my argument, that masculine perspectives rule the shaping of 
tort law doctrines. For men, one might say, pregnancy and birth are the most obvious, in physical 
terms, moments of human connectedness, where protection to that interest should be granted. For 
women, in contrast, it is only the beginning of a long, mutual journey.  
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having the utmost protection gap between pure-economic loss and 
indirect-emotional harm, and holds a record number of discrimination 
dimensions that work against women. However, the differences in the 
gender equality ratings of the three systems are reflected in the survey of 
their protection tendencies of gender-related interests within a specific 
doctrine of tort law. 
Pointing to this interesting correlation, I do not contend that a necessary 
causation between the two is established. However, ignoring such 
interesting findings altogether seems erroneous. Any distributive justice 
critique of tort law, including feminist analysis, is vulnerable to 
criticisms of randomness, illegitimacy and ineffectiveness, stemming 
from the fact that tort law is a private mechanism for resolution of 
private disputes having no strong relevance to “public sphere” 
considerations. Though firmly grounded,302 these arguments seem to be 
weakened by this startling correlation between women’s status in general 
in these countries and their status within the framework of a seemingly 
anecdotal tort law doctrine. 
The difference between the Anglo-American and Israeli legal systems—
namely, the fact that the former did not advance pure-economic loss 
within the ambit of tort law—can also be explained by shifting the gaze 
to the Anglo-American systems. Anita Bernstein, a prominent feminist 
critic of tort law, contends that the complex nature of economic loss 
contributed tremendously to its unsuitability to afford protection under 
negligence law.303 Another contention may be that the attentiveness of 
Anglo-America in maintaining clearer boundaries between tort law and 
contract law also shaped its reluctance to protect economic interests 
within a tort law regime.304 I chose, however, to focus on the Israeli 
trajectory which offers a positive (as opposed to a hypothetical) account 
of the gendered tendencies of legal systems that are derived from 
feminist analysis of interests that can be proven to be gender-related.    
302. TSACHI KEREN-PAZ, TORTS, EGALITARIANISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 23-67 (2007). 
303. Bernstein contends that the non-recognition of pure-economic loss is rooted in the wish 
“…[T]o remain intelligible to prospective plaintiffs, tortfeasor-defendants, and jurors (in the United 
States), tort law must articulate its demands simply, with a relatively low common denominator in 
mind.” Pure-economic loss is held by this article to posses all the contrasting complex-adding traits. 
Bernstein, supra note 126, at 778. 
304. See the text accompanying supra notes 86-96. For a discussion of the thesis that courts 
have denied liability when the party suffering physical harm might have indemnified the victim of 
economic loss through a “channeling contract”-a contract that would reduce the amount of litigation 
by allowing the victim of physical harm to recover economic losses of others as well, see Rizzo, A 
Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of Torts, 11 JOUR. LEGAL STUD. 281 (1982).  
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Izhak Englard, a well-known Israeli tort law philosopher and a former 
Supreme Court Justice, wrote a landmark book concerning basic notions 
of Israeli law as well as Anglo-American tort law. Moving from 
discussing emotional harm to economic loss, he wrote:305
“If until now the discussion of the practical problems of modern 
tort law may have appeared to concentrate on relatively marginal 
issues, the present topic is placed at the very heart of tort 
liability.” 
These words illustrate, even if only incidentally, the conceptual gap 
concerning the status of these interests in tort law within all three 
systems.306
Tort law arises from knowledge which is produced within social 
structures.  It is thus shaped in light of perceptions of the social 
attribution of losses as gender-related. Consequently, it directly 
influences the attitudes towards these losses. Despite the neutral 
discourse practiced in this area, negligence law represents a clear picture 
of the gendered power relations in which the male gender related 
interests enjoy greater protection than that granted to female gender 
related interests. 
The necessity for a change in tort law’s unsatisfactory protection of 
emotional interests is normatively established by virtues of its own 
merits as well as by comparison to the protection given to pure-economic 
loss. Such change is also easy to implement in practice. Common-law 
tort law is flexible and can be easily modified.307 Particularly, the tort of 
negligence and its duty of care component exemplifies regimes of 
standards that are open to creative interpretation rather than pre-dictated 
rules.308 Within the three common-law legal systems surveyed, the courts 
exert an enormous influence on the way in which the final legal outcome 
is shaped and can easily accommodate a political tendency to equalize 
gender related values.309  Carrying out this kind of change should be the 
305. ENGLARD, supra note 38, at 211. 
306. Englard’s point of reference here, however, seems to be descriptive rather than normative. 
307. Bender, supra note 3, at 575. 
308. Duncan Kennedy, Forms and Substance, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1687, 1751-1770 (1975-1976). 
The negligence tort is a paradigmatic manifestation of a standard regime. See MARK KOLMAN, A
GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, 37-38 (1987). 
309. Such a trend can also be used without difficulty in the Israeli tort law, in view of the local 
courts’ characterization of the tort of negligence: “The categories of negligence are never closed, 
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courts’ mission if they are committed to achieving substantive equal 
access to tort law and to allowing its fair and appropriate application. 
they are never rigid and they are never frozen in place, but rather they are determined according to 
the sense of morality and social and societal justice and the changing needs of society.” Ya’ari,
supra note 38, at 779.  
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